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POST-KATRINA RECONSTRUCTION LIABILITY:
EXPOSING THE INFERIOR RISK-BEARER
STEVEN L. SCHOONER*
ERIN SIUDA-PFEFFER**

I. INTRODUCTION: EXPOSING THIRD PARTIES TO HARM
In this young century, both the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and Hurricane
Katrina have graphically reminded Americans that they do not live in a perfect world. The
aftermath of both events continues to weigh heavily upon the public and dramatically affect
the nation’s fiscal outlook. Moreover, the two events demonstrate that unanticipated crises
such as these -- and the responses to them -- can cause unimaginable destruction and injury1
*

Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Government Procurement Law Program,
George Washington University Law School; B.A., Rice University, 1982; J.D., College of
William & Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, 1985; LL.M., George Washington
University Law School, 1989. This Article derives from testimony given at a hearing
before the Subcommittee on Superfund and Waste Management of the United States Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works in November 2005. The authors thank John
Duffy, Kathryn Kelly, Frederick Lawrence, Richard Pierce, Heidi Schooner, and Sonia
Suter for their helpful comments, acknowledge the generous support of the Seymour
Herman Faculty Research Fund in Government Procurement Law, and note that last year
marked the passing of John Cibinic (1930 – 2005), who left behind a remarkable legacy in
the literature, pedagogy, and practice of government contract law. See generally 35 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 3 (2005); 47 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 332 (2005); CONT. MGMT., Oct. 2005, at 70;
and PROC. LAW., Fall 2005, at 20.
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B.A., Amherst College, 2001; J.D., George Washington University Law School, 2006.
1
See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1068T, SEPTEMBER 11: HEALTH
EFFECTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD TRADE CENTER ATTACK 1 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d041068t.pdf [hereinafter GAO, WTC HEALTH EFFECTS]
(“When the [World Trade Center] buildings collapsed on [September 11], nearly 3,000
people died and an estimated 250,000 to 400,000 people were immediately exposed to a
mixture of dust, debris, smoke, and various chemicals.”); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-1053T, HURRICANE KATRINA: PROVIDING OVERSIGHT OF THE NATION'S
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY ACTIVITIES 1 (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d051053t.pdf. (“[Hurricane Katrina] affected over a half
million people . . . . [S]tanding water and high temperatures have created a breeding
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as well as impose tremendous financial burdens on society.2 As all levels of government in
the United States increasingly rely on the private sector to provide essential services to the
public,3 post-disaster recovery efforts have come to involve a progressively larger pool of

ground for disease . . . . Hurricane Katrina also resulted in environmental challenges, such
as water and sediment contamination from toxic materials released into the floodwaters.”).
2
See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-461R, AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF
CONTRACTORS RESPONDING TO HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA 1 (2006), available at
http://www.gao.gov/ new.items/d06461r.pdf [hereinafter GAO, AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF
KATRINA CONTRACTORS] (“Congress has appropriated over $62 billion as an initial
commitment . . . to the Gulf Coast states impacted by the . . . hurricanes.”). These costs are
dwarfed by the costs associated -- directly and indirectly -- with the September 11th attacks
on New York City and Washington, D.C. Congress initially appropriated $40 billion to
assist with disaster recovery. 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L. No. 107-38,
115 Stat. 220. Shortly thereafter, it supplemented this amount with an open-ended
appropriation for the establishment of the Victim Compensation Fund. See September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-42 § 406(b), 115 Stat. 230, 240
(codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note (Supp. II 2002)). Indirect costs include, among other
things, forgone federal taxes, see Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001, Pub. L. No.
107-134, 115 Stat. 2427 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and other titles), and
lost state and city revenue, see GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-269, SEPTEMBER
11: RECENT ESTIMATES OF FISCAL IMPACT OF 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK ON NEW YORK
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05269.pdf.
3
New Public Management (NPM), which gained hold in the United States in the mid1990s under the moniker “reinventing government,” is a movement to transform the public
sector. For the two works that are largely responsible for popularizing “reinvention”
principles in this country, see generally AL GORE & NAT’L PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM
RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS
(1993), and DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO
STATE HOUSE, CITY HALL TO PENTAGON (1992). NPM seeks to apply traditionally private
sector business techniques to the provision of public services and to thereby enable
government to provide such services with greater productivity and efficiency. See Jamil E.
Jreisat, The New Public Management and Reform, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
PRACTICE AND REFORM 539, 541 - 42 (Kuotsai Tom Liou ed., 2001). Proponents of NPM
advocate increased privatization and the “contracting out” of government services. See
GRAEME A. HODGE, PRIVATIZATION: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE 40
(1999); see also Robert B. Denhardt & Janet Vinaznt Denhardt, The New Public Service:
Serving Rather Than Steering, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 549 (2000); E. S. Savas, Privatization
and the New Public Management, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1731, 1731 - 32 (2001)
(providing several examples of privatization -- both domestic and international -- ranging
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contractual arrangements,4 many hastily drafted and poorly managed.5 As was graphically
demonstrated at Ground Zero of the World Trade Center attacks, when the government and
its contractors rush to respond, those who physically carry out the response bear the
consequences of their haste. Many individuals who selflessly assisted at the World Trade
Center site were badly injured.6 Many anticipate that relief workers will be subjected to a
similar level of harm in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.7
The risks faced by disaster area residents and relief workers can only be exacerbated
when the parties who can best alleviate such risks fail to act responsibly and when the law
fails to otherwise hold them accountable. The doctrine of sovereign immunity limits the
government’s legal liability for harms related to disaster relief,8 and, through the

from the protection of North Atlantic salmon to the renovation of military housing).
4
See GAO, AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF KATRINA CONTRACTORS, supra note 2, at 1 (“The
private sector is an important partner with the government in responding to and recovering
from natural disasters . . . . [S]uch partnerships increasingly underlie critical government
operations.”).
5
See id. at 2 – 4 (reporting that government contracts awarded in the wake of Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita suffered from inadequate planning, did not clearly communicate
responsibilities, and did not sufficiently utilize oversight personnel).
6
See generally Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Physical Health Status of World
Trade Center Rescue and Recovery Workers and Volunteers –- New York City, July 2002 August 2004, 53 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 807 (2004), available at http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5335.pdf [hereinafter MMWR Report].
7
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H10235, 40 – 42 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2005) (statement of Rep.
Major Owens, and Letter from the National Council for Occupational Safety and Health
(Oct. 6, 2005)); Michelle Chen, Relief Workers May Be Next Wave of Katrina Victims,
NEWSTANDARD, Sept. 23, 2005, http:// newstandardnews.net/content/index.cfm/items/2395.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has published guidelines and
recommendations for Hurricane Katrina relief workers in an effort to address health and
safety issues preemptively. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Hurricane
Information for Response and Cleanup Workers,
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/hurricanes/ workers.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).
8
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a relic of royalty -- originating from the English
common law premise that the King could do no wrong -- and its continued life under
American jurisprudence is not easily justified. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207
(1882) (“[W]hile the exemption of the United States . . . from being subjected . . . to
ordinary actions in the courts has . . . been repeatedly asserted here, the principle has never
been discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established
doctrine.”); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 12.1, at
342 – 43 (1993) (citations omitted). But see Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353
(1907) (“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete
theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the
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government contractor defense, its contractors have been able to enjoy some of that
immunity.9 As contractors assume a greater portion of the government’s duties, they are
increasingly voicing their desire for increased legal protection10 where the government,
shielded by sovereign immunity, would not face liability for negligent harms.
In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Congress is currently considering legislation
intended to provide insulation against liability for contractors involved in disaster relief and
reconstruction. The Gulf Coast Recovery Act (GCRA)11 would broadly apply the
government contractor defense and thereby forestall private tort litigation arising from
contractors’ work in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and other similar disasters.12 Not
surprisingly, the GCRA enjoys strong support amongst contractors.13 Cognizant of the
government’s current (and future) fiscal crisis,14 deficit hawks are reluctant to pursue any
alternative program in which the government would indemnify contractors.15 Additionally,

authority that makes the law on which the right depends.”); AMAN & MAYTON, supra, §
14.1.3, at 532 (suggesting a functionalist justification for the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, namely, that the doctrine insulates the government’s official actions from undue
influence) (citations omitted). Indeed, many academics have expressed dissatisfaction with
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign
Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001) (“Sovereign immunity is inconsistent with a
central maxim of American government: no one, not even the government, is above the
law.”); David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 548
(1997) (“Sovereign immunity is a rotten idea. If states commit wrongs, they should be
accountable for them.”).
9
See infra text accompanying notes 55 - 65.
10
See Press Release, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Senate Bill Would Limit
Contractors’ Risk of Law Suits for Aiding in Rescue and Recovery Efforts in Gulf Coast
(Sept. 22, 2005), available at http:// www.agc.org/galleries/pr/05-094.doc [hereinafter AGC
Press Release].
11
S. 1761, 109th Cong. (2005).
12
See id. § 5.
13
See AGC Press Release, supra note 10.
14
See Gov’t Accountability Office, Our Nation's Fiscal Outlook: The Federal
Government's Long-Term Budget Imbalance, http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/ longterm/
(last visited Apr. 15, 2006) (“Absent policy change, a growing imbalance between expected
federal spending and tax revenues will mean escalating and ultimately unsustainable federal
deficits and debt.”); PETER G. PETERSON, RUNNING ON EMPTY 9 - 10 (2004) (“[I]n just three
years [(2001 to 2003)] U.S. voters witnessed a negative swing of over $10 trillion in the
ten-year federal deficit outlook. By the year 2014, that will amount to $90,000 in additional
federal debt for every household.”); Rudolph G. Penner & Alice M. Rivlin, Dimensions of
the Budget Problem, in RESTORING FISCAL SANITY 2005: MEETING THE LONG-RUN
CHALLENGE 17, 17 - 34 (Alice M. Rivlin & Isabel Sawhill eds., 2005).
15
Deficit hawks, who place great emphasis on keeping the federal budget under control

Draft – Harvard Journal on Legislation (forthcoming 2006) Schooner (JOL 43.2) Page 5
critics of the plaintiffs’ and class-action bars support such situational immunity for
contractors as a logical step towards tort reform.16
This Article, however, asserts that the GCRA grossly misses the mark when judged
against two commonly suggested normative goals of tort law: the GCRA neither serves the
ends of justice and fairness by compensating victims, nor does it minimize the costs of
harm by deterring contractors from acting negligently.17 This Article first criticizes the
GCRA’s doctrinal structure, which is primarily founded upon an improper use of the
government contractor defense. By jettisoning the traditional predicate to the defense, that
a government contractor has explicitly followed government direction to its detriment, the

and the federal deficit low, have become increasingly alarmed at the rate of government
spending in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. See Donald Lambro & Amy Fagan, Defer
Drug Benefit to Offset Katrina, Deficit Hawks Urge, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2005, at A2
(“Deficit hawks both inside and outside of Congress say adding the cost of recovery and
rebuilding to the deficit is a bad idea.”). If the government were to provide contractors with
indemnification, it would essentially be insuring its contractors against liabilities they incur
to individuals injured by the contractors’ negligence, resulting in further government
expenditures after national disasters. See infra notes 173 – 175 and accompanying text
(discussing indemnification for unusually hazardous risks). Under the GCRA, however, the
government would bear no economic responsibility for harm resulting from contractors’
negligent acts.
16
The Senate hearing on the GCRA included frank disparagement of the plaintiffs’ bar.
See infra text accompanying notes 132, 136 - 138. This is to be expected in light of the
political leanings of the GCRA’s sponsor (Sen. John Thune (R-S.D.)) and co-sponsors (Sen.
Jim DeMint (R-S.C.); Sen. Michael B. Enzi (R-Wyo.); Sen. James M. Inhofe (R-Okla.);
Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.); Sen. Lisa Murkowski (R-Alaska); Sen. Rick Santorum (R-Pa.);
Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska); and Sen. David Vitter (R-La.)). See 151 CONG. REC. S10378
(2005); 151 CONG. REC. S10514, 10515 (2005); 151 CONG. REC. S10594, 10596 (2005);
151 CONG. REC. S11130, 11131 (2005). See generally REPUBLICAN NAT’L COMM., 2004
REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM: A SAFER WORLD AND A MORE HOPEFUL AMERICA (2004),
available at http:// www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf (“America’s litigation system is
broken. Junk and frivolous lawsuits are driving up the cost of doing business in America
by forcing companies to pay excessive legal expenses to fight off or settle often baseless
lawsuits . . . .”); Nathaniel L. Bach, Note, Trial Lawyer on the Ticket: Electoral Rhetoric
and the Depiction of Lawyers in the 2004 Presidential Campaign, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
317, 319 - 36 (2006) (analyzing the tort reform “cornerstone” of the Bush-Cheney domestic
policy agenda during the 2004 presidential election).
17
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
24 (1970). This is not, of course, to suggest that the GCRA’s only flaw is its failure to
address the principle goals of tort law. See infra note 79 (discussing the GCRA’s
encroachment upon states’ rights). Such problems, however, are beyond the scope of this
Article.
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GCRA unmoors the defense from its logical underpinnings -- the insulation of the
discretionary functions of government from liability.18
This Article further bemoans the economic inefficiencies likely to result from this
distortion of the government contractor defense. First, the GCRA fails to allocate the risks
of disaster relief efforts to the parties who can best access information about the potential
risks associated with such work and can most effectively avoid or protect themselves
against these risks.19 Instead, it shifts these risks to individuals who lack the opportunity to
assess, avoid, or insure against them.20 Second, by alleviating contractors’ accountability
for negligent actions, the GCRA creates a moral hazard, diminishing the incentives for
responsible contractor behavior and potentially increasing the incidence of harmful
behavior.21 This Article advocates allocating the risks of disaster relief work to those
parties who can most effectively minimize the costs of these activities or who can best bear
the risks inherent in such work,22 a solution superior to that embodied by the GCRA. In
other words, Congress should allocate these risks to the party in the best position to
understand, anticipate, assess, avoid, mitigate, insure against, or, ultimately, bear the
potential loss.23
18

See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 – 12 (1988). For a more
extensive discussion of the government contractor defense, see infra Part III.A.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 113 - 119.
20
As discussed infra Part III.B, the GCRA does not preserve the possibility of victim
compensation by either diluting the government's sovereign immunity or mandating that the
government indemnify its contractors. It merely leaves individuals without a remedy if
they are injured by the tortious acts of contractors involved in, among other things, debris
removal or reconstruction work in disaster zones.
21
See infra notes 121 - 124 and accompanying text.
22
The law and economics literature suggests the desirability of allocating risk to the party
who can most effectively reduce the costs of harm or who can best bear the risk. See Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J.
1055, 1060 (1972) (proposing that liability should rest with the party best positioned “to
make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs, and to
act on the decision once made”); see also Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield,
Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 83, 88 - 92 (1977) (analyzing risk allocation in the context of contract impossibility).
See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998); Richard
A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
23
Guido Calabresi’s categorization of accident cost reduction efforts into three tiers of
“subgoals” is instructive. See CALABRESI, supra note 17, at 26 - 31. “Primary” cost
reduction encompasses efforts to reduce the number and severity of accidents. Id. at 26 27. “Secondary” cost reduction addresses the societal costs that indirectly result from the
accident, such as rehabilitation and care of the injured. Id. at 27 - 28. Societal costs may be
reduced, and possibly minimized, by spreading accident losses -- shifting the risk of these
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This Article finally proposes that the GCRA is undesirable absent empirical
evidence of either (1) a dearth of qualified companies willing to compete for the
government’s business or (2) a market failure in the insurance industry. This Article
concedes that contractors involved in disaster relief may face risks for which sufficient
insurance is unavailable. Nonetheless, among all alternative solutions, the GCRA is one of
the least appropriate; in all likelihood, it would compound the effects of the devastation it
was intended to address. Congress does not lack for more appropriate solutions to deal with
whatever risks arise in post-catastrophe clean-up. For example, the government could
model risk management on the third-party liability provisions of the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR)24; or the hazardous risk indemnification allowed by Public Law 85804,25 which permits contractual relief under extraordinary circumstances such as high-risk
research and development involving nuclear power or highly volatile missile fuels.26
Alternatively, the government could establish a victim compensation fund, drawing upon
models such as the September 11th captive insurance fund27 or the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program.28 Each of these options is preferable to the GCRA’s unnecessary,
inefficient, and unfair allocation of risk to the residents of disaster areas and the relief
workers who come to their aid.
II. OPPORTUNISTIC POST-CRISIS BEHAVIOR

costs from individuals (i.e., potential injurers and victims) to society in the aggregate. See
id. at 39 - 42. Finally, tertiary cost reduction involves managing the transactional costs of
the administrative or market machinery that is used to achieve primary and secondary cost
reduction. Id. at 64 - 66. From this, Calabresi persuasively argues that the party best
equipped to reduce the costs of the accident should bear those costs. Id. at 40 - 42.
24
48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7 (2005). The FAR “is established for the codification and
publication of uniform policies and procedures for acquisition by all executive agencies.”
Id. § 1.101.
25
Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1431 - 1435 (2000)); see also 48 C.F.R. §§ 50.403-1 to -3 (2005).
26
See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Environmental Liability Under Public Law 85-804: Keeping
the Ordinary Out of Extraordinary Contractual Relief, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 215, 260 - 61
(2003) (explaining that the legislative history of Public Law 85-804 indicates that
indemnification should be limited to research, development, and production in the fields of
nuclear power or highly volatile missile fuels); Michael Abramowicz, Predictive
Decisionmaking, 92 VA. L. REV. 69, 108 – 113 (2006) (suggesting nuclear safety regulation
as a candidate for “predictive decisionmaking,” as an alternative to the limited liability
model found in, for example, the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2000)).
27
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-7, div. K, tit. III, 117
Stat. 11, 517 - 18 (2003).
28
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2000).
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Congress intended the GCRA to protect contractors.29 While the GCRA would do
so, it does not serve the public interest.30 Specifically, it seeks to capitalize upon Hurricane
Katrina’s devastation to obtain, for the contractor community, long-sought after, and longdenied, insulation from liability in post-crisis situations.31 Unfortunately, this legislative
initiative reflects a broader, disconcerting trend of seemingly opportunistic post-crisis
behavior. Under the guise of exigency, both the Bush administration and Congress have
utilized Hurricane Katrina to effectuate public policies that are unnecessary and untenable,
and thus might not otherwise have survived debate or scrutiny.
For example, in its $51.8 billion post-Katrina emergency supplemental
appropriation, Congress hastily raised the “micro-purchase threshold” (which, in effect,
serves as the government charge card purchase cap)32 to $250,000 for purchases relating to
relief and recovery from Hurricane Katrina.33 That hundred-fold increase on the existing
29

Section two of the GCRA lists the congressional findings supporting the bill’s proposed
relief. These findings emphasize that government contractors provide vital assistance in
responding to national disasters and that fears of future litigation may discourage this
assistance. See S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 2 (2005). The GCRA is thus intended “to ensure
that . . . contractors continue to answer the governmental requests for assistance in times of
great need.” Id. § 2(12)(a).
30
See Richard S. Markovits, Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Content of the CorrectiveJustice-Securing Tort Law of a Liberal, Rights-Based Society, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 243,
249, 287 (2006) (arguing that governments of “rights-based [s]tates” are obligated to
“maximize the rights-related interests” of their citizens, and thus should have “legally
enforceable . . . duties” to (1) avoid committing torts against their citizens, (2) reduce the
occurrence of torts between citizens, and (3) provide victims of tortious conduct with
appropriate opportunities to seek redress). Markovits concludes that “government officials
can promulgate goal-oriented tort legislation if, but only if . . . the legislation in question
does not on balance disserve the rights-related interests of the relevant society’s members
and participants.” Id. at 250; see also id. at 283 - 85. Responsible government should
focus on serving the public interest. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification
for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1514 (1992) (“[G]overnment’s
primary responsibility is to enable the citizenry to deliberate about altering preferences and
to reach consensus on the common good.”).
31
See infra notes 128 and 135 discussing bills to reduce contractor liability proposed in
the mid-1980s.
32
See 48 C.F.R. § 13.201(b) (2005) (making government purchase cards the “preferred
method” for micro-purchases).
33
Second Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act to Meet Immediate Needs
Arising from the Consequences of Hurricane Katrina, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-62, § 101(2),
119 Stat. 1990, 1992. Although government purchase cards were first used during the
Reagan administration in the late 1980s, their use gained momentum in the early 1990s
with former Vice President Al Gore’s National Performance Review, which strongly urged
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$2500 limit34 far exceeded the already flexible $15,000 ceiling Congress had previously
made available during contingencies and emergencies.35 While pressure quickly forced the
administration to bar further use of this authority,36 the fact that the $250,000 threshold
became law at all, without meaningful discussion, is shocking.37 At the time of the
threshold increase, more than 300,000 government purchase cards were in circulation,38 and
a mountain of Inspector General reports, Government Accountability Office studies, and
congressional hearings had demonstrated that the government’s management of its charge

agencies to increase their reliance on government purchase cards. See Neil S. Whiteman,
Charging Ahead: Has the Government Purchase Card Exceeded Its Limit?, 30 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 403, 407 - 11 (2001). The 1994 enactment of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243 (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C. and 41
U.S.C.), fueled government purchase card activity by (1) creating a $2500 “micropurchase”
threshold (and thereby exempting purchases under that threshold from many of the onerous
regulations that govern most procurements), see 41 U.S.C. § 428(b), (f) (2000), and (2)
allowing agencies’ procurement organizations to delegate purchasing authority to
nonprocurement card-holding personnel, see id. § 428(c); see also Whiteman, supra, at 411
- 12.
34
41 U.S.C. § 428(f); 48 C.F.R. § 2.101 (2005).
35
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the micro-purchase threshold for supplies or
services acquired by the Department of Defense for the purpose of defending the United
States against terrorist attacks was increased to $15,000. Federal Acquisition Regulation;
Temporary Emergency Procurement Authority, 67 Fed. Reg. 56,120 - 56,121 (Aug. 30,
2002) (codified in scattered sections of 48 C.F.R.).
36
See Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Office of Mgmt. &
Budget, Executive Office of the President, Limitation on Use of Special Micro-purchase
Threshold Authority for Hurricane Katrina Rescue and Relief Operations (Oct. 3, 2005),
available at http://63.161.169.137/omb/procurement/ micro-purchase_guidance_10-0305.pdf (requesting that agencies not use the increased micro-purchase authority unless there
are “exceptional circumstances”). Nonetheless, purchase card usage appears robust. The
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security estimated the value of Katrinarelated purchase card transactions, as of December 30, 2005, at approximately
$50.9 million. See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND EFFICIENCY, PCIE 12-17-05
TO 12-30-05 BIWEEKLY REPORTING PERIOD: HURRICANE KATRINA AGENCY DATA,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/ assetlibrary/OIG_PCIE_123005.pdf [hereinafter
HURRICANE KATRINA AGENCY DATA].
37
See Bill Marsh, Here Is Your New Federal Credit Card, Here Is Your New Purchase
Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2005, § 4, at 14; Steven L. Schooner, Fiscal Waste? Priceless,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2005, at B13.
38
FED. PROCUREMENT DATA CTR., U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT
REPORT FY 2003 § 1, at 13 (2003), available at http://www.fpdsng.com/downloads/
FPR_Reports/FPR2003a.pdf.
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cards was abysmal.39 Not only does the temptation of poorly supervised purchase cards
encourage fraudulent behavior,40 but such programs also run counter to the fundamental
procurement principles of transparency, integrity, and competition.41 In August 2005, the
White House recognized these systemic problems and issued long overdue (and slow to be
implemented) purchase card guidance, mandating fundamental training and risk
management policies.42 Not only would the micro-purchase increase have exacerbated the
existing purchase card management debacle, but it would have devastated many small
businesses,43 which receive approximately two-thirds of all federal procurement dollars

39

See generally The Use and Abuse of Government Purchase Cards: Hearing Before the
H. Subcomm. on Governmental Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations of the H. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong. (2002); OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF DEF., REP. NO. D-2002-029, DOD PURCHASE CARD PROGRAM
AUDIT COVERAGE (2001), available at http://www.ignet.gov/randp/cards/dod-D-2002029.pdf; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-676T, GOVERNMENT PURCHASE CARDS:
CONTROL WEAKNESSES EXPOSE AGENCIES TO FRAUD AND ABUSE (2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d02676t.pdf; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-717T,
PURCHASE CARDS: INCREASED MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL COULD SAVE
HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04717t.pdf.
40
For a lengthy discussion of the purchase card program’s fundamental flaws, which lead
to widespread abuse and fraud, see Jessica Tillipman, The Breakdown of the United States
Government Purchase Card Program and Proposals for Reform, 2003 PUB. PROCUREMENT
L. REV. 229, 234 – 41 (2003).
41
See Steven L. Schooner & Neil S. Whiteman, Purchase Cards and Micro-Purchases:
Sacrificing Traditional United States Procurement Policies at the Altar of Efficiency, 2000
PUB. PROCUREMENT L. REV. 148, 158 – 64 (2000); Whiteman, supra note 33, at 442 - 55.
But see Jeff P. MacHarg, Note, Doing More With Less -- Continued Expansion of the
Government Purchase Card Program by Increasing the Micropurchase Threshold: A
Response to Recent Articles Criticizing the Government Purchase Card Program, 31 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 293, 305 - 11 (2002).
42
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR
NO. A-123, MANAGEMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNAL CONTROL app. B, at 6 - 13
(2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a123/a123_appendix_b.pdf.
43
Typically, government purchases between $2500 and $250,000 would be set aside for
small businesses. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 19.501, .502-1(b), .502-2(a), .502-2(b) (2005); see also
Schooner, supra note 37, at B13 (“Anecdotal information and experience suggests that the
lion’s share of purchase card transactions benefit large businesses. That’s not surprising,
given the convenience offered by stores such as Wal-Mart, Staples, Home Depot and Best
Buy.”); Whiteman, supra note 33, at 456 (“The Government makes the bulk of its purchase
card transactions from large businesses.”).
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awarded through contracts under $250,000.44
Similarly, the Bush administration capitalized on the post-Katrina sense of urgency
by suspending the Davis-Bacon Act in the counties damaged by the hurricane.45 The
Davis-Bacon Act is a pro-labor compensation regime which requires that federal
construction workers be paid no less than prevailing wage rates.46 Thus, prolonged
suspension of the Davis-Bacon Act would have permitted contractors to profit from the
massive reconstruction effort without ensuring that their workers receive wages sufficient
for entry into the ranks of the lower middle class. The administration’s putative
explanation -- that the suspension would save taxpayers’ money and guarantee a sufficient
supply of labor47 -- proved unpersuasive. After widespread criticism,48 the administration
reversed the suspension.49
In both of these examples, reason ultimately overcame opportunistic encroachments
upon established procurement policies. Hopefully, reason also will prevail over the GCRA.
It may well be that contractors engaged in post-disaster work struggle and sometimes fail to
obtain sufficient insurance. Nonetheless, prospectively releasing contractors from
commonly anticipated liabilities allocates the risk of harms caused by contractor negligence

44

Telephone Interview with Paul Murphy, President, Eagle Eye, in Fairfax, Va. (Sept. 9,
2005). Eagle Eye is a commercial service that processes and repackages government
procurement data. See Eagle Eye, Inc., About Eagle Eye, http://
www.eagleeyeinc.com/Search.FPC?pg=10 (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).
45
Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,227 (Sept. 8, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2005/09/20050908-5.html.
46
40 U.S.C. § 3142 (Supp. II 2002). To be clear, the Davis-Bacon Act does not mandate
that firms employ only union workers: it merely requires that firms pay “prevailing” wage
rates and benefits, which typically correlate with those enjoyed by union workers. See id.
47
See Proclamation No. 7924, 70 Fed. Reg. at 54,227 (“The wage rates imposed by [the
Davis-Bacon Act] increase the cost . . . of providing Federal assistance to [areas affected by
Hurricane Katrina] . . . . Suspension of [the Davis-Bacon Act] will result in greater
assistance to these devastated communities and will permit the employment of thousands of
additional individuals.”); see also News Release, Congressman Charlie Norwood,
Administration Grants Norwood Request for Temporary Suspension of Davis-Bacon Act
Restrictions on Rebuilding After Katrina (Sept. 8, 2005), available at http://
www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ga09_norwood/DavisBacon.html.
48
See, e.g., Editorial, A Shameful Proclamation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2005, at A16;
Thomas B. Edsall, Bush Suspends Pay Act in Areas Hit by Storm, WASH. POST, Sept. 9,
2005, at D3; Susan Jones, Democrats, Unions Blast Bush Over Federal Rebuilding Effort,
CNSNews.com, Sept. 9, 2005, http://www.cnsnews.com/
Politics/Archive/200509/POL20050909a.html.
49
Proclamation No. 7959, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,899 (Nov. 3, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2005/11/20051103-9.html.
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to the victims harmed by such negligence.50 That cannot be the optimal solution. If the
liability insurance market truly fails, the government -- as the party best able to assess the
risk, avoid, mitigate, or insure against harm, and, should it be necessary, bear the costs of
harm -- may ultimately need to indemnify its contractors, or otherwise finance the
compensation of victims.51 Katrina’s devastated communities, however, should not bear
the brunt a second time.
III. PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC INTEREST
A. Distorting the Government Contractor Defense
The GCRA, which would grant virtually unprecedented liability protection to a
contractor’s recovery work in disaster zones,52 is as inconsiderately drafted as it is
misguided. Its most startling (and, ultimately, problematic) provision extends a rebuttable
presumption that the government contractor defense applies to contractors certified as
“necessary for the recovery of a disaster zone.”53 This solution disregards the premise that
government direction serves as the touchstone for the government contractor defense.54
Moreover, the formulaic certification process provided by the GCRA, coupled with the
federal government’s increasingly unstructured and chaotic contracting practices, renders
this alteration of the defense particularly pernicious.

50

See infra Part III.B.
“[I]ndividual moral rights holders whose tort-related rights have been sacrificed by
[their] government['s] failure[] [to secure these rights by legislation] will have a moral right
to receive compensation from the government . . . .” Markovits, supra note 30, at 291.
52
Similar liability protection can be found in the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering
Effective Technologies Act of 2002 (SAFETY Act), 6 U.S.C. §§ 441 – 44 (Supp. II 2002).
As discussed infra Part III.A.3, however, the GCRA is vastly different from the SAFETY
Act, chiefly because the SAFETY Act applies only to extraordinarily risky and evolving
technologies. Although the SAFETY Act was a unique approach to liability protection
when passed in 2002, Congress has indicated its intention to use the SAFETY Act as a
model for other private sector industries not only through the proposal of the GCRA, but
also through the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act), Pub. L.
109-148, div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2818 – 32 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d-6d
to -6e), discussed infra Part III.A.3.
53
S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 5(d) (2005).
54
See infra note 62 (discussing of the importance of government direction, and
consequent lack of contractor discretion, in the application of the government contractor
defense).
51

Draft – Harvard Journal on Legislation (forthcoming 2006) Schooner (JOL 43.2) Page 13
1. Ignoring the History of the Government Contract Defense
The GCRA misuses the government contractor defense and, in so doing, damages
its viability. Although its roots trace to the 1940s,55 the modern government contractor
defense grew out of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)56 and later found solid footing

55

In Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20 - 22 (1940), the Supreme
Court refused to hold a public works contractor liable for erosion of the plaintiff’s property
allegedly caused by construction performed under a federal government contract, applying
agency principles to extend the government’s sovereign immunity to the contractor. After
Yearsley, lower courts struggled to apply the defense to a wider range of cases, specifically
to those involving products manufactured according to government specifications. See
Randal R. Craft, Jr., The Government Contractor Defense: Evolution and Evaluation, in
THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE: A FAIR DEFENSE OR THE CONTRACTOR’S
SHIELD? 3, 7 - 9 (Juanita M. Madole ed., 1986) (discussing relevant opinions between 1940
and 1980).
56
Enacted in 1946, FTCA, ch. 753, §§ 401 – 24, 60 Stat. 812, 842 – 47 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), initially exposed the military to liability. See,
e.g., Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 - 52 (1949) (holding that service members
can pursue negligence claims against the government for injuries not incident to service).
Soon after passage of the FTCA, however, the Supreme Court ruled that the government is
not liable under the FTCA when service members’ injuries “arise out of or are in the course
of activity incident to service.” Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). After
Feres, defense supply contractors became the target of choice in product liability suits
because the government was no longer an available defendant. That situation proved
unfair, because contractors, compelled to execute clear government directives, did not
exercise independent discretion. The Court further complicated the legal treatment of
military contractors in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666
(1977), a case in which malfunctions in a government-specified, contractor-manufactured,
aircraft ejection system injured a serviceman. When the serviceman alleged negligence
against both the contractor and the United States, the contractor cross-claimed seeking
indemnity from the government, alleging that “any malfunction . . . was due to faulty
specifications, requirements, and components provided by the United States.” Id. at 667 68. The Court relied on Feres to dismiss both the serviceman’s claim against the
government and the contractor’s request for indemnification. See id. at 669, 673 - 74.
Feres and Stencel thus placed military contractors in a bind. See R. Todd Johnson,
Comment, In Defense of the Government Contractor Defense, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 219,
227 (1986) (“The Feres-Stencel doctrine created an insurmountable dilemma . . . by
excusing the government both from suit by serviceman and from indemnification actions
brought by the contractor.”). Their only option was to assert the still-developing
government contractor defense discussed in this section. See, e.g., id. at 224 - 27; Kateryna
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with In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation.57 Agent Orange required that
contractors manufacturing products for the government prove three elements to successfully
assert the government contractor defense: that (1) the government established the product
specifications, (2) the product met the specifications in all material respects and (3) the
government knew as much or more than the contractor about the hazards associated with
the product.58 In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,59 the Supreme Court modified and
clarified these elements.60 Contractors may assert the affirmative defense when (1) the
United States approved reasonably precise design specifications, (2) the equipment
conformed to those specifications and (3) the contractor warned the government about
relevant dangers known to it, but not the government.61 The first two elements “assure that
the suit is within the area where the policy of the ‘discretionary function’ would be
frustrated -- i.e., they assure that the design feature in question was considered by a
Government officer, and not merely by the contractor itself.”62 Although Boyle addressed a

Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors & Civil Liability, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
(forthcoming 2006).
57
534 F. Supp. 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
58
Id. at 1055. The court elaborated on the third element by explaining that a contractor
was required to inform the government of information known to it, but unknown to the
government, regarding the hazards of the product. Id. at 1057. The Agent Orange
approach was adopted in large part by the Ninth Circuit in McKay v. Rockwell International
Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 451 (9th Cir. 1983), which modified the first prong to allow the
defense where the government either established or approved reasonably precise design
specifications. Thereafter, most courts followed the McKay formulation of the government
contractor defense. See Craft, supra note 55, at 14 – 25. However, the Eleventh Circuit
remained a notable exception. See Shaw v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 740,
745 - 46 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing use of the defense only if the contractor either
participated only minimally in design specifications or warned the government of all known
risks and disclosed known alternative designs).
59
487 U.S. 500 (1988). Boyle involved the death of a serviceman who drowned when he
was unable to release the escape hatch of a submerged helicopter. Id. at 502. The plaintiff
sued the contractor that supplied the military with the helicopter, alleging, among other
things, that the escape hatch was defectively designed to be outward-opening, which made
it impossible for his son to release the hatch when subject to water pressure. Id. at 503.
60
Id. at 511 - 12.
61
Id. at 512.
62
Id. Focusing on the discretionary function exception to the FTCA, the Court reasoned
that it makes little sense to subject a contractor to state tort suits for manufacturing products
that conform to designs fashioned or approved by a federal official when the federal official
would enjoy immunity from similar suits. Although the FTCA waives the government’s
sovereign immunity for negligent or wrongful acts or omissions, 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (2000),
it expressly exempts matters in which the government exercises a discretionary function, id.
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military product (or supply), lower courts have extended its application to nonmilitary
products.63 Today, lower courts increasingly allow contractors to assert the defense with

§ 2680(a). In an earlier case, Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988), the Supreme
Court elaborated on the requirements that must be met before the discretionary function
exemption may be applied. First, a mandatory statute or regulation prescribing a specific
course of action must not have constrained the government decision being challenged. Id.
at 536. Second, the government decision, when not so constrained, must have been
grounded in social, economic, or political policy. Id. at 536 - 37. Thus under the FTCA’s
discretionary function exemption, the government’s right to assert sovereign immunity is
most likely to be engaged when a government official exercises discretion. In contrast, the
protection offered by the government contractor defense as established in Boyle will most
often be engaged when the contractor demonstrates its lack of discretion. Because such a
lack of contractor discretion necessarily implies the presence of discretion on the part of
government officials, the government contractor defense ensures that contractors are
afforded liability protection only in those cases where the government itself would receive
such protection under the FTCA’s discretionary function exemption. See Peter C. Brown,
Blowing the Lid Off Pandora’s Box: A Look at the Effect of the Design-Build Contract on
the Government Contractor Defense, CONSTRUCTION LAWYER, July 1997, at 17, 17.
Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 364 A.2d 43 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), decided before
Boyle, illustrates the importance of establishing the element of government discretion in
any assertion of the government contractor defense. In Sanner, a passenger, who sustained
injuries after being thrown out of a vehicle manufactured by Ford for the military, alleged
that the company negligently failed to install safety belts. Id. at 43 - 44. Prior to
manufacturing the vehicle, Ford offered the Army a design that included safety belts, which
the Army rejected, “because occupants could be compromised due to deterred egress and
escape in tactical situations as well as enhancing injuries in the event of a roll-over.” Id. at
44 - 46. The court accepted the government contractor defense, finding that “Ford had no
discretion to exercise with respect to installation of seat belts, roll bars or other restraints.
The decision was that of the . . . Army[, which] specifically rejected the installation of these
so-called safety devices.” Id. at 47.
63
See, e.g., Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1123 - 28 (3d Cir. 1993) (civilian
ambulance manufacturer); Yeroshefsky v. Unisys Corp., 962 F. Supp. 710, 717, 719 - 21
(D. Md. 1997) (manufacturer of keyboard equipment for the United States Postal Service);
Andrew v. Unisys Corp., 936 F. Supp. 821, 829 - 32 (W.D. Okl. 1996) (manufacturer of
letter sorting machines for the United States Postal Service); Lamb v. Martin Marietta
Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 966 - 68 (W.D. Ky. 1993) (company in charge of
operating a nuclear facility for the Department of Energy). But see, e.g., In re Haw. Fed.
Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 810 - 12 (9th Cir. 1992) (precluding insulation supplier from
asserting the government contractor defense because its products were not military
equipment).
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regard to service contracts64 in addition to product or supply contracts.65
While the GCRA purports to apply the government contractor defense in the context
of disaster relief with only a procedural variation, the GCRA effectively eviscerates the
substantive legal underpinnings of the defense. For certified contractors, the GCRA would
create a “rebuttable presumption that . . . all elements of the government contractor defense
are satisfied; and . . . the government contractor defense applies in the lawsuit.”66 This
ignores the first requirement of Boyle -- that the government approve, in a reasonably
precise manner, the scope of the work. Again, the ordinary government contractor defense
protects contractors who explicitly follow government direction to their detriment.67
Although the government need not create the specifications or otherwise withhold all
discretion from the contractor,68 some sort of meaningful government choice or decision is
required before the defense can come into play.69 To the extent that contractors exercise
64

The FAR distinguishes contracts for services (from custodial to clerical and medical)
from those for supplies (end items or widgets, from furniture to fighter aircraft) and
construction (building, repairing, or renovating structures or improving real estate). Service
contracts “directly engage[] the time and effort of a contractor whose primary purpose is to
perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end item of supply.” 48 C.F.R. §
37.101 (2005).
65
See, e.g., Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter/Textron, 328 F.3d 1329, 1334 - 45 (11th Cir.
2003) (accepting government contractor defense of a company providing helicopter
maintenance to the Army); Richland-Lexington Airport Dist. v. Atlas Props., Inc., 854 F.
Supp. 400, 421 - 24 (D.S.C. 1994) (applying the defense to a company supplying
decontamination services to the Environmental Protection Agency). In the context of a
service contract, the Boyle test remains essentially the same: (1) the government must have
approved reasonably precise procedures to be followed in providing the service, (2) the
contractor’s performance must have conformed to those procedures and (3) the contractor
must have warned the government about dangers in those procedures that were known to it,
but not to the government. See Hudgens, 328 F.3d at 1335. This test continues to focus on
the “overriding question of who, the government or the contractor, ultimately had the most
significant discretion in controlling the end result.” Paul M. Laurenza & Michael W.
Clancy, The Government Contractor Defense: Post-Boyle Expansion and the SAFETY Act,
80 FED. CONTRACTS REP. 477, 481 (2003).
66
S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 5(d)(1) (2005).
67
See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
68
See Carley, 991 F.2d at 1125 (“[I]t is necessary only that the government approve,
rather than create, the specifications . . . .”).
69
See Trevino v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 865 F.2d 1474, 1480 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The mere
signature of a government employee on the ‘approval line’ . . . , without more, does not
establish the government contractor defense.”). Guidelines for contractors regarding the
successful assertion of the defense emphasize the need to ensure that the government
actually approved precise specifications or procedures. For example, one author has
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significant amounts of discretion in the performance of their contracts, however, the
defense has not protected them.70 As summarized by Ralph Nash and John Cibinic,
[T]he Supreme Court has given a set of straightforward requirements -- the most
important of which is the Government approval requirement. . . . [W]here the
Government agency is a full participant in the design process, the defense can be
predicted to be a winner. In contrast, if the Government has not participated in
design the contractor will find it very hard to use the defense.71
Thus, without a governmental act of discretion, there is little legal or policy justification for
extending the government’s sovereign immunity to the contractor.
2. Violating the Spirit and Intent of the Government Contractor Defense
The GCRA’s supporters assert that the legislation “implements the requirements
already set forth by the Supreme Court,”72 thereby avoiding costly litigation involving the
advised that to assert a successful government contractor defense,
the actual approving authority . . . should prepare to discuss not only what the
Government wanted in terms of design, but the level of expertise among the
government design approval team, and how dependent the approval officials were
on the contractor’s designers for purposes of contract review . . . . [T]he
Government should also provide a record of communications between the contractor
and the Government, documenting the ‘give and take’ in the design process that
shows conscious government approval of every design suggestion and change.
John J. Michels, Jr., The Government Contractor Defense: The Limits of Immunity After
Boyle, 33 A.F. L. REV. 147, 160 (1990); see also Carl L. Vacketta et al., The “Government
Contractor Defense” in Environmental Actions, BRIEFING PAPERS, Dec. 1989, at 7
(advising government contractors to “do whatever [they] can to facilitate Govt [sic] review
and inspection of every aspect of [their] contract work”). Conversely, plaintiffs are advised
that their “best line of attack” in response to a defendant’s assertion of the government
contractor defense is to argue that the government did not exercise the requisite discretion
over specifications. See Charles E. Cantu & Randy W. Young, The Government
Contractor Defense: Breaking the Boyle Barrier, 62 ALB. L. REV. 403, 420 - 22 (1998).
70
See, e.g., Raymond B. Biagini & Ray M. Aragon, The Government Contractor
Defense: Limiting Product Liability in the New Procurement Environment, 39 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 169, at 3 (1997) (“[Only] the contractor that proves ‘the Government made
me do it’ can share in the Government’s sovereign immunity.”).
71
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Postscript: The Circuit Court View of the
Government Contractor Defense, 4 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 52 (1990).
72
Oversight Hearing on the Impact of Certain Governmental Contractor Liability
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Boyle elements and increasing certainty and uniformity.73 The argument that the
certification requirement fulfills Boyle’s first element,74 however, rings hollow, because the
purely perfunctory certification process fails to consider the amount of discretion enjoyed
by the contractor in performing the work.
Contractors seeking certification would submit a request to the Corps of
Engineers.75 To issue the certification, the Chief of Engineers need only conclude that
(1) the work takes place in a disaster zone76 and (2) at least one-half of the work falls within
specified categories, including routine activities such as debris removal, reconstruction
work, and search and rescue operations.77 Unlike the judicial predicate for applying the
government contractor defense, the Chief of Engineers need not consider the amount of
discretion the contractor enjoyed in performing the work.78 Moreover, certification would
control federal, state, or local government contracts.79 If certification involved a

Proposals on Environmental Laws: Hearing on S. 1761 Before the Subcomm. On Superfund
and Waste Management of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 109th Cong.
79 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Craig S. King, government contracts
attorney). Craig King has further argued that “[u]nder Supreme Court standards, the
Government contractor defense would apply to disaster relief efforts without S. 1761.” Id.
at 75.
73
See Hearing, supra note 72 (written statement of Craig S. King).
74
See id. at 78 (statement of Craig S. King).
75
S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 5(d)(4)(B) (2005) (referring to “the submission of a request for
a certification”). The GCRA would encompass both past performance and future
performance. See id. (defining certification as a determination that “a government contract
was or will be necessary for the recovery of a disaster zone,” and focusing the certification
inquiry in part upon “the scope of work that the government contract does or will require”)
(emphasis added). Because the language of the GCRA does not specify the source of the
submission, it leaves open the possibility that a request could be submitted either by the
government, a contractor, or another entity, such as an insurance company. See id. §
5(d)(4)(A) (providing that the Chief of Engineers is responsible for reviewing “any
government contract that any person or entity, including any governmental entity, claims to
be necessary for the recovery of a disaster zone from a disaster for the purpose of
establishing a government contractor defense”).
76
Pursuant to the GCRA, the term “disaster zone” includes those geographical areas
affected by Hurricane Katrina as well as any other region affected by a major disaster
requiring federal assistance exceeding $15 billion. Id. § 3(1).
77
Id. § 5(a)(1), (d)(4).
78
See id. § 5(d)(4)(c); cf. supra text accompanying notes 67 - 71 (emphasizing that the
ordinary government contractor defense only protects contractors who explicitly follow
government direction and limit their own exercise of discretion).
79
S. 1761 § 3(2)(A)(ii) (defining “government contract” to include contracts entered into
by federal, state, and local governments). In other words, the Corps certification would
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comprehensive review of the discretion retained by the government or delegated to the
contractor, it might appear reasonable to presume that the elements of the government
contractor defense would be satisfied. The GCRA certification process, however, ignores
the presence or absence of governmental approval of either the contractor’s methods or
means of contract performance. Whereas the sort of liability protection provided by the
GCRA is usually reserved for government entities and those acting under their discretion,
the GCRA extends this protection to parties whose decisions cannot be attributed in any
way to the government.
The GCRA would not only provide inappropriately broad access to the government
contractor defense, but it would leave little procedural room for a plaintiff to defeat its
preclusive force. Once granted a certificate of need under the GCRA, contractors and
subcontractors could raise the government contractor defense to defeat claims brought by a
negligently injured party. Specifically, the GCRA would entitle the contractor to a
“rebuttable presumption” that all the elements of the government contractor defense were
satisfied and that the government contractor defense applied to the lawsuit.80 Yet the
presumption offered by the GCRA hardly seems rebuttable on its merits; if anything, the
GCRA’s presumption is more analogous to a government official’s defense of qualified
immunity.81

override negotiated or legislated allocations of risk in state, local, or municipal contracts,
even if the federal government was not a party to those contracts. This is not an isolated
intrusion on state authority; the GCRA establishes exclusive federal jurisdiction for
lawsuits arising out of the performance of a contract in a disaster zone. See id. § 5(a).
Thus, in the unlikely event that a contractor has not been granted certification (meaning that
the government contractor defense would not insulate it from liability), a negligently
harmed individual can assert state tort claims only in federal court. Moreover, individuals
injured by a Corps-certified state or local government contractor are denied recourse in a
wide range of federal causes of action. The GCRA expressly prohibits any action against a
contractor engaged in disaster-recovery work (whether certified or not) under federal laws
or regulations that are administered by the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of
Transportation, or the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. Id. § 4(a).
This means that individuals cannot hold contractors accountable for violations of, for
example, the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 – 1387 (2000), which is administered by
the Environmental Protection Agency, see id. § 1251(d). The propriety and
constitutionality of these encroachments upon states’ rights, however, are beyond the scope
of this Article.
80
S. 1761 § 5(d)(1), (2).
81
The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials [as opposed to
private parties such as contractors] . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
An official’s qualified immunity is overcome only by showing that the government official
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Typically, a rebuttable presumption merely shifts the burden of proof to one
challenging the presumption, who may then attempt to rebut the presumption by producing
evidence to the contrary.82 Here, however, no effect would be given to even the production
of specific, unequivocal evidence demonstrating the lack of those conditions traditionally
requisite to the success of a government contractor defense. The only way to overcome the
GCRA’s presumption is through evidence that the entity seeking certification acted
fraudulently or with willful misconduct in submitting information to the Corps of
Engineers.83 Logically, a statutory certification system should be subject to reasonable
constraints on the legal consequences of certification, informed by the substance of the
threshold requirements for certification. The pro forma certification provided for in the
GCRA, however, violates such expectations; it offers no more than a procedural rubber
stamp with a nearly indelible ink.
Advocates of the GCRA suggest that the second element of Boyle -- that the
contractor performed in accordance with the approved scope of the work -- is met because
the GCRA only protects a contractor for work done within the scope of its contract.84 But
reality belies this theory as well. Post-September 11th experience has demonstrated that,
particularly in emergency contracting, the government loosely describes its contractors’
work, if the work is defined at all.85 Contractors concede that this norm -- including oral

knew or should have know that his or her actions would cause injury to the plaintiff. See id.
at 818 - 19. Similarly, the showing required to overcome the GCRA’s rebuttable
presumption is quite taxing. See S. 1761 § 5(d)(3). However, qualified immunity operates
somewhat differently than a “mere defense to liability” of the sort provided by the GCRA;
qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial under certain circumstances” and
may be “effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 512 (1985); see also Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User's
Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187, 190 (1993).
82
See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1224 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a rebuttable presumption
as “[a]n inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which may be
overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence”) (citations omitted).
83
S. 1761 § 5(d)(3).
84
See, e.g., Hearing, supra note 72, at 78 - 79 (statement of Craig S. King).
85
See GAO, AGENCY MANAGEMENT OF KATRINA CONTRACTORS, supra note 2, at 1 (“The
[hurricane] response efforts . . . suffered from [i]nadequate planning and preparation . . .
[and i]nsufficient numbers and inadequate deployment of personnel to provide for effective
contractor oversight.”); see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-274, CONTRACT
MANAGEMENT: OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE SURVEILLANCE ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SERVICE CONTRACTS (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d05274.pdf
(finding that twenty-six out of ninety contracts reviewed suffered from insufficient quality
assurance surveillance); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-605, REBUILDING IRAQ:
FISCAL YEAR 2003 CONTRACT AWARD PROCEDURES AND MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 5
(2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04605.pdf (“The agencies encountered
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agreements and handshake deals86 -- pervades the post-Katrina recovery efforts.87 When a
skeletal, overcommitted government acquisition workforce rushes to identify contractors,
hastily drafts contracts (or relies upon open-ended, vague statements of work), and fails to
manage contract performance, the government essentially delegates any exercise of

various contract administration challenges . . . stemming in part from . . . lack of clearly
defined roles and responsibilities . . . . [D]efining key terms and conditions of the contracts
remain[s a] major concern[].”)
86
“A letter contract is a written preliminary contractual instrument that authorizes a
contractor to begin . . . manufacturing supplies or performing services.” 48 C.F.R. §
16.603-1 (2005). Because letter contracts permit work to proceed before the contracting
parties achieve a meeting of the minds, they offer a recipe for disaster. Although Congress
permits use of these “undefinitized contractual actions,” “[t]he general policy has been to
greatly restrict the use of such transactions because they are open-ended arrangements that
place the risk of excessive costs largely on the Government.” JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH
C. NASH, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1073 - 74 (1998); see also 48
C.F.R. § 16.603-3 (2005) (imposing procedural limitations on letter contracts).
87
Anthony Zelenka, President of Bertucci Contracting Corporation, explained that his
company went to work on an oral agreement to execute a written contract. Hearing, supra
note 72, at 24 (statement of Anthony Zelenka). Warren Perkins, Vice-President of Boh
Brothers Construction Company, indicated that his company was doing work “on little
more than a handshake . . . . We did not demand the time we would normally take to
scrutinize contractual terms and conditions.” Id. at 36 (statement of Warren Perkins).
Further, Mr. Perkins stated that “the work that was asked of us had no specifications, had
nothing to rely on, no design specifications, no specifications whatsoever.” Id. at 44. Mr.
Perkins expressed doubt in the government’s ability to adequately direct disaster relief
efforts. See id. at 22 (“[T]he contracting agencies have to guide and direct the recovery
effort. . . . [But] we cannot be sure that the agencies are in charge.”). This open-ended style
of contracting is not unique to post-Katrina recovery efforts. Sweeping changes in the
procurement environment emphasizing outcome over process have made the government
more akin to a commercial purchaser; this trend has minimized government’s involvement
in, and control over, product design. See Steven L. Schooner, Fear of Oversight: The
Fundamental Failure of Businesslike Government, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 627, 630 - 31 (2001)
[hereinafter Schooner, Fear of Oversight] (explaining that, at a macro level, the reinvented
procurement system is (1) defined by greater purchaser discretion, (2) less encumbered by
bureaucratic constraint and internal oversight, and (3) more businesslike). See generally
Steven L. Schooner, Commercial Purchasing: The Chasm Between the United States
Government's Evolving Policy and Practice, in PUBLIC PROCUREMENT: THE CONTINUING
REVOLUTION 137 (Sue Arrowsmith & Martin Trybus eds., 2003) [hereinafter Schooner,
Commercial Purchasing]. As the government delegates more discretion to contractors, “the
new regime . . . casts doubt on contractors’ ability to enjoy the Government contractor
defense’s protection.” Biagini & Aragon, supra note 70, at 3.
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discretion to contractors.88 Such open-ended arrangements fail to provide the specific
direction or approval historically required for application of the government contractor
defense.89
The government’s failure to provide contractors engaged in post-Katrina clean-up
work with an appropriate level of direction for invocation of the government contractor
defense is due, in large part, to its current dearth of contracting or acquisition personnel.
Congress was quick to authorize more auditors and inspectors general to scrutinize
Hurricane Katrina-related contracting,90 but made no corresponding call for more
88

The lack of competition utilized in awarding contracts, although an inexact proxy, gives
credence to the disturbing picture of Katrina-related contracting practices derived from
anecdotes. Despite the competition mandates of the Competition in Contracting Act
(CICA) of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, §§ 2701 – 2753, 98 Stat. 494, 1175 – 1203 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 31 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.), that pervade the
federal acquisition system, competitive contract awards have been the exception, not the
rule. See generally 48 C.F.R. pt. 6 (2005). As of December 30, 2005, of the 579 contracts
in excess of $500,000 awarded by the Department of Homeland Security for Katrina relief,
only 115 (or just under 20%) employed full and open competition. HURRICANE KATRINA
AGENCY DATA, supra note 36; see also 48 C.F.R. § 6.102 (2005) (listing “[t]he competitive
procedures available for use in fulfilling the requirement for full and open competition”).
In contrast, 378 (65%) of those contracts were awarded “no bid/sole source.” HURRICANE
KATRINA AGENCY DATA, supra note 36. Government-wide, a similar trend emerges: of the
905 contracts in excess of $500,000, only 246 (just over 25%) employed full and open
competition, while 542 (approximately 60%) were awarded “no bid/sole source.” Id.
89
Over time, contrary to Congress’s intent to reduce litigation, the GCRA might provoke
increased litigation against the government pursuant to the FTCA. The GCRA would
insulate contractors from liability even when the government aggressively outsources
disaster-area work without giving proper attention to contract drafting or engaging in any
meaningful oversight. Under the GCRA, a negligently injured individual in need of
compensation would have only one option remaining -- to sue the government. The FTCA
waives the government’s sovereign immunity and permits a suit in tort absent an exercise of
discretion. Here, an injured party might assert that the government delegated the exercise
of discretion to its contractor. This could be perceived to be an abdication, rather than an
exercise, of discretion. In other words, the discretionary function exemption might not
apply when the government did not, for example, provide the contractor with clear
guidance or ongoing oversight. Thus, the government might find itself being held directly
liable for the individual’s injury.
90
Charles R. Babcock, 600 People Monitoring Hurricane Contracts, WASH. POST, Jan.
13, 2006, at D2 (“The federal government has sent nearly 600 auditors and investigators to
the Gulf Coast region to monitor $8.3 billion in contracts awarded to help victims of last
year's hurricanes, according to year-end figures released by the Department of Homeland
Security.”).
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contracting experts to perform the functions necessary for the procurement system to
operate efficiently.91 Sadly, the government’s acquisition workforce has been strained to
the breaking point.92 Nor has the Bush administration suggested any reason for optimism
that the issue will be addressed in the foreseeable future.93
91

See Steven Kelman & Steven L. Schooner, Scandal or Solution?, CONT. MGMT., Jan.
2006, at 62, 62. The contracting workforce has desperately required a dramatic
recapitalization after the bipartisan, post-Cold War, 1990s initiative to reduce the
contracting workforce. See generally GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-443, FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT: SPENDING AND WORKFORCE TRENDS (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ d03443.pdf; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF
DEF., REP. NO. D-2000-088, DOD ACQUISITION WORKFORCE REDUCTION TRENDS AND
IMPACTS (2000), available at http://www.dodig.osd.mil/ audit/reports/fy00/00-088.pdf;
Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 87, at 671 - 72.
92
The 1990s workforce reductions left the government woefully unprepared for the
dramatic increase in procurement spending since September 11th and Hurricane Katrina. In
the last four years, after years of stagnation, government contracting dollars have increased
dramatically, with yearly rates of growth between 6.5% and 22.1%. See FED.
PROCUREMENT DATA CTR., U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., TRENDING ANALYSIS REPORT FOR
THE LAST 5 YEARS, http://www.fpdsng.com/downloads/
top_requests/FPDSNG5YearViewOnTotals.xls (last visited Apr. 15, 2006). However,
these increased expenditures on government contracts have not been accompanied by a
corresponding increase in the workforce. See supra note 91. See generally Steven L.
Schooner, Feature Comment: Empty Promise for the Acquisition Workforce, 47 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 203 (2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=719685; Griff Witte &
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Short-Staffed FEMA Farms Out Procurement, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
2005, at D01. At some level, this problem is exacerbated by pressure from the current
administration to outsource. Outsourcing, or its more palatable pseudonym, “competitive
sourcing,” has been one of five government-wide initiatives in the Bush management
agenda. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE
PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA, FISCAL YEAR 2002 17 – 18 (2002), available at
www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2002/mgmt.pdf; Dru Stevenson, Privatization of
Welfare Services: Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 83 (2003)
(“President Bush is a major advocate of . . . hiring private firms to do the government’s
work.”) (citing David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 BROOK.
L. REV. 231, 232 (1998)); see also Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization
of Property Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1763 (2002) (“Governor Bush sought to
hand administration of the state’s welfare system over to . . . Lockheed Martin . . . and
Electronic Data Systems.”).
93
David Safavian, while serving as Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy under
the Bush administration, made clear that the administration had no plans to invest in a
recapitalization of the acquisition workforce. See David H. Safavian, Feature Comment:
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The government needs a massive influx of experienced professionals to identify and
select quality suppliers, ensure fair prices, draft contracts, manage and evaluate contractor
performance, and provide proper oversight.94 The negative ramifications of poorly planned,
vaguely written, and ill-managed contracts in this context are obvious: they allow
contractors to weigh, among other things, haste versus caution, or, to some extent, profits
versus care. For example, in removing debris from New Orleans a contractor might face
significant economic choices with regard to (1) the experience of its personnel (drivers with
spotless safety records might demand higher wages), (2) the quality and maintenance of its
equipment (newer, better maintained trucks likely cost more to purchase or lease), (3) the

Delivering Results for the Acquisition Workforce, 47 GOV'T CONTRACTOR ¶ 267 (2005)
(responding to Schooner, supra note 92, by claiming that “[a]n across-the-board call for
more billets is an overly simplistic approach to a complex and challenging issue. . . . OMB
does not support an increase in billets merely to establish an arbitrary level for the
acquisition corps.”). Sadly, Safavian’s indictment for obstructing investigations and
making false statements during his prior position at the General Services Administration set
back, and may have crippled, serious procurement reform for the remainder of the Bush
administration. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former GSA Chief of Staff David H.
Safavian Indicted for Obstruction of Proceedings and False Statements (Oct. 5, 2005),
available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2005/October/ 05_crm_521.htm.
94
A simple “lesson learned” in Iraq was that, if the government relies heavily upon
contractors, the government must maintain, invest in, and apply appropriate professional
resources to select, direct, and manage those contractors. Unfortunately, insufficient
contract management resources were applied. See, e.g., Hearing on Contracting Issues in
Iraq: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Readiness and Management Support of the S.
Comm. on Armed Services, 109th Cong. 2 (2006) (statement of Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.,
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction), available at http://www.sigir.mil/
reports/pdf/testimony/SIGIR_Testimony_06-001T.pdf (“[T]he important lesson is that
oversight works . . . . But, it works more efficiently the earlier it is put in place. Provisions
for formal oversight of Iraq reconstruction should have been established at the very
beginning of the endeavor.”); Major Gen. George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu
Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, in INVESTIGATION OF
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB 1, 52 (2005), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/ d20040825fay.pdf (“[T]here was no credible
exercise of appropriate oversight of contract performance at Abu Ghraib.”). See generally
Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in
a Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549 (2005). Indeed,
this problem exists across the entire spectrum of government contracts. See Steven
Kelman, Strategic Contracting Management, in MARKET BASED GOVERNANCE: SUPPLY
SIDE, DEMAND SIDE, UPSIDE, AND DOWNSIDE 88, 89 - 90, 93 (John D. Donahue & Joseph S.
Nye Jr. eds., 2002) (“[T]he administration of contracts[,] once they have been signed, has
been the neglected stepchild of [the procurement system reform] effort[].”).
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means of performance (minimally acceptable environmental practices likely cost less than
the most modern, clean, and safe technologies) and (4) time management (truck drivers
might save time and money by transporting hazardous waste through, rather than around,
residential communities). Responsible governance would not entail ceding such decisions
to contractors.95 Also, without an indication of true necessity, the government should not
insulate its contractors against suits by parties injured as a result of the contractors’
negligent actions. To do so would unnecessarily expose residents and relief workers in
disaster areas to the detriments of contractor decisions unconstrained by democratically
accountable government.
3. Form Over Substance: Misuse of the SAFETY Act Model
The GCRA makes more sense if considered in the context of the model upon
which it is based,96 the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of
2002 (SAFETY Act).97 The SAFETY Act, a post-September 11, 2001 initiative,
encourages the development and protects the use of new or evolving (and, implicitly,
unproven) technologies. Once the Under Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) certifies a technology as a qualified anti-terrorism technology (QUATT), a
rebuttable presumption of the government contractor defense applies to lawsuits “arising
out of, relating to, or resulting from an act of terrorism” when the QUATT has been
deployed in defense against, in response to, or in recovery from the terrorist act.98 The
SAFETY Act’s underlying assumption is that, without insulation from liability, contractors

95

See Seidenfeld, supra note 30, at 1514.
Hearing, supra note 72, at 95 (statement of Craig S. King, government contract
attorney) (“There is no doubt on earth this statute is patterned after the SAFETY Act.”).
97
6 U.S.C. §§ 441 – 44 (Supp. II 2002). See generally Alison M. Levin, Note, The
SAFETY Act of 2003: Implications for the Government Contractor Defense, 34 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 175 (2004).
98
6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(1). Note that there is a difference between designation as a QUATT
and certification as a QUATT. Compare 6 C.F.R. §§ 25.3, 25.5 (2005) (contemplating
QUATT designation), with id. §§ 25.6, 25.7 (contemplating QUATT certification).
Although a QUATT designation triggers certain liability limitations, the rebuttable
presumption of the government contractor defense only applies to a technology that has
received QUATT certification. See id. § 25.6. QUATT certification is only available once
a technology has been designated a QUATT. See id. § 25.7(f). It entails a further level of
government review than that required for QUATT designation. Compare id. § 25.3(b)
(listing the criteria to be considered for designation), with id. § 25.6(a) (listing the
additional criteria to be considered for certification).
96
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might not otherwise permit the government to deploy these QUATTs to combat terrorism.99
These contracts involve unusual types of work or technologies, or unusual uses of
technologies, that are perceived as extraordinarily risky.100
Recently, Congress also borrowed from the SAFETY Act model to create the Public
Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act),101 which provides broad legal
protection to parties involved in the production and distribution of covered
“countermeasures,”102 when the Secretary of Health and Human Services identifies their
countermeasure in a public health emergency declaration.103 Unlike the PREP Act, the
GCRA would apply the unique SAFETY Act model to far more common, if not mundane,
tasks.104 Although they are clearly important, the contracts that the GCRA would cover by
and large involve routine tasks such as search and rescue; demolition and repair; debris
removal; and dewatering of flooded property.105 For services such as these, it seems far
less reasonable to shield contractors from liability for all but the most egregiously wrongful
actions. These are not the types of work that can only be performed by an extremely
limited pool of contractors or that require the use of unique facilities.
99

For a discussion of the SAFETY Act’s purpose and legislative history, see Levin, supra
note 97, at 176 - 78; see also Laurenza & Clancy, supra note 65, at 482 (“[P]rotection for
contractors against the potential extraordinary liability that may result from an act of
terrorism is essential if the federal government is to be able to work effectively with the
private sector in the development and procurement of anti-terrorism technologies.”).
100
This point cannot be overemphasized. For a cogent articulation of this principle (in
the context of indemnification), see, for example, Tolan, supra note 26, at 260 - 61
(emphasizing the unique and extraordinary nature of the contractual requirements,
particularly in research and development, that proved uninsurable because they involved,
for example, nuclear power or highly volatile missile fuels).
101
Pub. L. 109-148, div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2818 – 32 (2005) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 247d-6d to -6e).
102
PREP Act sec. 2, § 319F-3(a)(1), 119 Stat. at 2818 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d6d(a)(1)). The PREP Act includes a rather confusing definition of “covered
countermeasure.” See id. sec. 2, § 319F-3(i)(1), 119 Stat. at 2827 – 28 (to be codified at 42
U.S.C. § 247d-6d(i)(1)). Essentially, the term encompasses drugs, biological products, or
devices that are authorized for use in diagnosing, mitigating, preventing, treating, or curing
a pandemic or epidemic.
103
Id. sec. 2, § 319F-3(b)(1), 119 Stat. at 2819 – 20 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d6d(b)(1)). Like the SAFETY Act and the GCRA, the PREP Act makes an exception for
willful misconduct. Id. sec. 2, § 319F-3(d), 119 Stat. at 2824 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §
247d-6d(d)).
104
See S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 5(a)(1) (2005).
105
See id. While the scope of Hurricane Katrina’s destruction may be unprecedented,
describing the work as routine reflects the nature of the work, rather than the importance of
the work.
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Contrast the private sector’s virtually unlimited capacity to provide, for example,
demolition and repair services with its extremely limited capacity to develop the type of
technologies certified under the SAFETY Act, such as “lamp-based infrared
countermeasure missile-jamming systems that can be deployed on fixed-wing aircraft to
defeat . . . heat-seeking . . . missiles” or “a computer network that screens and validates,
using biometric screening techniques, the identity of persons entering or leaving the United
States.”106 Although certified SAFETY Act technologies may involve “the normal work
that [the companies producing the technologies] do,”107 they are not widely available in the
commercial marketplace. Thus, while it may be “normal” for the specialized firms to
produce these technologies, nothing suggests that a significant capacity exists for the
private sector to produce them.
As discussed above, the GCRA process through which contractors would be able to
obtain liability protection –- certification by the Chief of Engineers -- lacks any substantive
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding contractual performance.108 This process bears
little resemblance to the highly judgmental and discretionary decisions to be made by the
DHS Under Security under the SAFETY Act.109 Specifically, the SAFETY Act employs
seven criteria,110 most of which are absent in the GCRA. For example, it is difficult to
imagine a scenario in which there would be a “[s]ubstantial likelihood that [for example,
debris removal] technology will not be deployed unless protections under [the GCRA, as
opposed to the SAFETY Act] are extended.”111 Furthermore, QUATT certification is only
106

Both the missile-jamming systems, produced by BAE Systems Information and
Electronic Systems Integration, and the computer network, produced by Accenture, have
been certified as QUATTs. Dep’t of Homeland Security, Recent SAFETY Act
Designations/ Certifications, https://www.safetyact.gov/dhs/
sacthome.nsf/Awards?OpenForm (last visited Apr. 15, 2006).
107
Hearing, supra note 72, at 96 (statement of Craig S. King).
108
See supra Part III.A.2.
109
But see Hearing, supra note 72, at 95 (statement of Craig S. King) (“Basically all the
same types of protections that we are talking about [in the SAFETY Act] would be [in S.
1761]. There would be a certification process, the whole sort of thing.”).
110
The criteria are (1) prior United States Government use or demonstrated substantial
utility and effectiveness, (2) availability of the technology for immediate deployment in
public and private settings, (3) existence of extraordinarily large or unquantifiable potential
third-party liability risk exposure to seller (or another provider of the technology),
(4) substantial likelihood that the technology will not be deployed unless SAFETY Act
protections are extended, (5) magnitude of risk exposure to the public if the technology is
not deployed, (6) evaluation of all scientific studies that can be feasibly conducted to assess
the capability of the technology to substantially reduce risks of harm and (7) whether the
technology would be effective in facilitating the defense against acts of terrorism. 6 U.S.C.
§ 441(b) (Supp II 2002).
111
See id. § 441(b)(4); infra notes 130 - 135 and accompanying text (discussing the lack
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granted after the DHS Under Secretary conducts a “comprehensive review” to determine
whether the technology will perform as intended, conform to the seller’s specifications, and
be safe for use as intended,112 while the GCRA requires no analogous review. Thus, the
SAFETY Act certification involves a significant, meaningful act of governmental discretion
and thereby approximates the judicial inquiry applied to the government contractor defense.
By forgoing such scrutiny, however, the GCRA abandons this traditional limitation on the
liability protection provided to government contractors -- a limitation without which the
extension of such protection loses its ordinary doctrinal justification.
B. Misallocating Risk
As a policy matter, the GCRA is unfair, inefficient, and unwise. The GCRA improperly
allocates risk of harm between negligently injured parties, contractors, and the
government.113 As a matter of policy, a better solution allocates risk to the superior risk
bearer or, alternatively, the least cost risk avoider.114 For most every activity that would be

of empirical evidence that threats of liability will significantly inhibit the market for the
disaster relief activities covered by the GCRA).
112
6 U.S.C. § 442(d)(2).
113
Generally, the government expects contractors to purchase insurance and, accordingly,
the government willingly pays contractors to obtain that insurance. Prospective
indemnification is employed only under extraordinary circumstances (for example, in the
nuclear industry) in which contractors either cannot obtain insurance for a certain risk or
cannot afford prohibitively priced premiums. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (1958) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431 - 1435 (2000)); 48
C.F.R. §§ 50.403-1 to -3 (2005) (allowing government indemnification of contractors for
unusually hazardous or nuclear risks). Thus, indemnification -- through which the
government, in effect, directly insures contractors rather than reimbursing the contractor for
its insurance costs -- derives from a market failure in the insurance industry. See generally
Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Risk of Catastrophic Loss: How to Cope, 2 NASH & CIBINIC
REP. ¶ 44 (1988). Bear in mind, however, that the indemnification debate focuses upon
prospective allocation of risk between the government and its contractors –- it does not
suggest that members of the public, if injured, should have no remedy.
114
In addition to fairness, economic efficiency also appears to dictate that the costs
incurred as a result of accidents be allocated to “the party or activity which can most
cheaply avoid them.” See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View at the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1096 - 97 (1972); see also Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 88 – 92. But see Gillian
Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 515 - 18 (1999) (suggesting that the allocation of risk to the
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covered by the GCRA, it is apparent that pursuit of either policy goal would require either
the government or its contractors to bear the risk of their negligent decisions or actions.
The superior risk bearer is the party best positioned to (1) appraise, in advance, the
likelihood that the risk will occur and the magnitude of the harm if it does occur, (2) insure
against the risk, either through self-insurance or market insurance and (3) bear the cost of
the harm.115 In the unique context of post-disaster clean-up and reconstruction, the party
harmed by negligent contractor behavior typically is less able to anticipate, assess, insure
against, or avoid contractor negligence.116 Both the contractor -- through market-supplied

party best able to bear the risk is less appropriate when the government is one of the
contracting parties). Hadfield asserts that private sector assumptions of efficiency fail when
transported to the public sector because “[t]o the extent that government has superior riskbearing capacity, it does not act in order to profit from this characteristic.” Id. at 516. In
other words, the government transfers risk for reasons other than efficiency. See id.
115
Posner and Rosenfield defined the superior risk-bearer as the party better able to insure
against the risk, which is determined by its (1) ability to determine, in advance, the
probability that the risk will occur and the magnitude of the loss if the risk does in fact
occur and (2) ability to diversify the risk away by pooling it with other uncertain events.
Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 90 - 92. Economist Christopher Bruce has similarly
focused on the parties’ abilities to mitigate damages resulting from the occurrence of the
risk through insurance. See Christopher J. Bruce, An Economic Analysis of the
Impossibility Doctrine, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 311, 322 - 23 (1982).
116
In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953), the Supreme Court held that the
FTCA prohibited a claim against the government by victims of the explosion of ammonium
nitrate fertilizer stored in a ship at the docks in Texas City. A negligence suit was filed
against the government because the fertilizer involved “had been produced and distributed
at the instance, according to the specifications and under the control of the United States.”
Id. at 18. Although Dalehite involved the issue of government liability rather than
contractor liability, the dissenting opinion of Justices Jackson, Black, and Frankfurter
emphasized the irrationality of imposing the cost of harm on the injured parties who quite
obviously were the inferior risk bearers:
The disaster was caused by forces set in motion by the Government, completely
controlled or controllable by it. Its causative factors were far beyond the knowledge
or control of the victims; they were not only incapable of contributing to it, but
could not even take shelter or flight from it.
Id. at 48 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For additional information on the
Texas City disaster, see generally HUGH W. STEPHENS, THE TEXAS CITY DISASTER 1947
(1997); Samuel B. Kent, The Texas City Disaster, 1947, Hugh W. Stephens, 28 J. MAR. L.
& COM. 675, 677 (1997) (book review); Local 1259, Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters, The Texas
City Disaster: April 16, 1947, http://www.local1259iaff.org/ disaster.html (last visited Apr.
15, 2006) (detailing the events of the tragic day through an historical account, pictures, and
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insurance -- and the government -- through indemnification, should market-supplied
insurance not be available -- are far better positioned than the potential victims of contractor
negligence to insure against the risk of such accidents and to thereby bear the cost of this
risk. Nonetheless, by expanding the liability protection of the government contractor
defense beyond its ordinary bounds,117 the GCRA imposes the cost solely on the
negligently injured individual.
Similarly, the least cost risk avoider is the party best positioned to take steps to
avoid or minimize the harm.118 Even when a harm is nearly inevitable, a party may be able
to either reduce the probability that the harm will occur or decrease the harm’s
magnitude.119 For example, consider a contractor hired to demolish private homes in the
New Orleans area that the government has deemed damaged beyond repair.120 Imagine that
the contractor destroys the wrong house -- i.e., a house that poses no danger and was
capable of being restored -- because either (1) the government was ambiguous when it
designated the houses for destruction and the contractor did not seek clarification or (2) the
contractor was negligent in its communications with the government about which houses
were slated for demolition. Whereas the contractor could have avoided a costly accident
with the exercise of reasonable care, the homeowner would not even know of a need to take
precautions that would have reduced the risk of the home’s destruction. Yet under the
GCRA, the homeowner would bear this loss.
In so doing, the GCRA would reduce the contractor’s incentive to adopt prudent risk
avoidance strategies (e.g., to inquire or confirm whether the house must be destroyed) when
faced with such an ambiguity.121 Under the GCRA, contractors could only be held liable

personal stories).
117
See supra Part III.A.1.
118
The least cost risk avoider is often conflated with the superior risk bearer. For
example, Posner and Rosenfield perceive that the superior risk bearer is not only better able
to insure against the risk, but is also better able to prevent the risk from materializing in the
first place. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 22, at 90.
119
See Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution,
73 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985) (“Even when necessary or unavoidable, an accident . . . causes
harm. The affected parties, however, can usually take steps to reduce the probability or
magnitude of the harm. The parties to a tortious accident can take precautions to reduce the
frequency or destructiveness of accidents.”).
120
Certification under the GCRA would most likely be granted in this case: the majority
of the contractor’s work was the performance of demolition activities in a declared disaster
zone. See S. 1761, 109th Cong. §§ 5(a)(1), 5(d)(4) (2005); supra text accompanying notes
77 - 81.
121
See Hearing, supra note 72, at 31 (statement of Dr. Beverly Wright, Director, Deep
South Center for Environmental Justice, Xavier University) (“If contractors no longer fear
legitimate legal liability, where is the incentive to do good work?”); id. at 55 (statement of
Dr. Joel Shufro, Executive Director, New York Committee for Occupational Health and
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for negligent actions if they engaged in reckless or willful misconduct.122 By thus lowering
the bar, the GCRA creates a moral hazard,123 increasing the possibility that third parties will
suffer harm as a result of contractor behavior.124

Safety) (“What S. 1761 does is to shift the costs of personal injuries and property damage
from the government contractors to the workers and/or the residents in the disaster areas.”);
id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer) (“[The GCRA] sends a . . . message . . . to the
contractors, well, do your best, because if you make a mistake, if you burn toxics, if you do
some other things, you know, you won’t be held responsible.”).
122
At the Hearing, Senator Thune emphasized that the GCRA “would not in any way
limit any contractor’s liability for recklessness or willful misconduct.” Hearing, supra note
72, at 4 (statement of Sen. John Thune). However, by limiting contractors’ liability for
negligent acts, the GCRA insulates contractors from the consequences of a significant
portion of their activities.
123
“‘[M]oral hazard’ refers to the tendency for insurance against loss to reduce incentives
to prevent or minimize the cost of loss.” Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard,
75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 239 (1996) (citing Joseph E. Stiglitz, Risk, Incentives and Insurance:
The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard, 8 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 4 (1983) (“[T]he
more and better insurance that is provided against some contingency, the less incentive
individuals have to avoid the insured event, because the less they bear the full consequences
of their actions.”)); see also Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further
Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 537, 537 – 38 (1968); Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty and
the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941, 961 - 62 (1963); Mark V.
Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531, 535 (1968).
Baker also explained that “economists’ models demonstrate[] . . . that insurance inevitably
increases the occurrence, magnitude, or cost of that which is insured against.” Baker,
supra, at 241. In other words, “[c]ontrol of moral hazard is essential to prevent . . .
dissipat[ion of] any deterrent force that the tort system possesses.” Seth J. Chandler, The
Interaction of the Tort System and Liability Insurance Regulation: Understanding Moral
Hazard, 2 CONN. INS. L.J. 91 (1996). In the context of contracting activities, moral hazard
can result when a contractor is insulated from liability for negligent behavior during the
course of performance and thus has a reduced incentive to take reasonable precautions
against risky activities. See Samir B. Mehta, Additional Insured Status in Construction
Contracts and Moral Hazard, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 169, 182 (1996). In Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953), not only did the dissenting Justices point out the irrationality of
imposing harm on the inferior risk bearer, see id. at 24, but they also quite reasonably
anticipated the moral hazard problem that results when parties are insulated from liability,
see id. at 50 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It is our fear that the Court’s adoption of the
Government’s view in this case may inaugurate an unfortunate trend toward relaxation of
private as well as official responsibility.”).
124
See Ronald A. Cass & Clayton P. Gillette, The Government Contractor Defense:
Contractual Allocation of Public Risk, 77 VA. L. REV. 257, 260 (1991) (“[T]he immediate
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From a policy perspective, protection of the public from harm -- rather than
protection of contractors’ economic interests –- must come first.125 Senator Barbara Boxer
(D-Cal.) explained that the government “should be on the side of the people that get hurt
directly, and [it] shouldn’t be in a situation where [it is] trying to make it more difficult for
them to receive compensation[.]”126 Senator James Jeffords (Ind-Vt.) also warned that
“[n]ow, more than ever, our government’s role should be to ensure that citizens are
protected from faulty cleanup efforts.”127 Instead of pursuing either of these goals, the
GCRA legislation would create a regime in which (1) the parties harmed by the negligence
of contractors would bear risks that they could not effectively reduce and (2) neither the
government nor its contractors would bear responsibility for harm inflicted through
accidents that could have been insured against or averted with reasonable precautionary
efforts. Again, these line-drawing questions regarding contractor liability are not new.128
But the solution offered by the GCRA –- that negligently injured parties, rather than the
government or its contractors, should bear the risk of loss inherent in ordinary disaster relief
work –- is as novel as it is unappealing.129

effect of the [government contractor] defense is to place the full cost of mishaps on injured
parties who, but for government involvement, would be able to shift that cost to the
contractors.”) (citations omitted).
125
“The most important objective . . . is the assurance of prompt and adequate
compensation of the public.” A.J. ROSENTHAL ET AL., CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS IN
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 12, 72 - 76 (1963).
126
Hearing, supra note 72, at 9 (statement of Sen. Barbara Boxer).
127
Id. at 6 (statement of Sen. James Jeffords).
128
The Department of Justice (DOJ) objected to a 1985 bill that would have reduced the
liability of contractors, because it did not “believe that government indemnification of
contractor losses is the appropriate way to solve the problems faced by government
contractors because of changing tort liability.” Indemnification of Government
Contractors: Hearing on S. 1254 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 21
(1985) (statement of Richard K. Willard, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Civil
Division, Department of Justice). Indeed, “[i]n the . . . few years [before 1985], the efforts
of government contractors to transfer their product liability exposure to the government
[had] increased dramatically.” Id. at 22. Although DOJ acknowledged “that the changes in
the tort system have created problems for contractors, [it did] not believe that
indemnification [was] an appropriate response, and certainly it [would not have corrected]
the underlying reasons for these problems.” Id. at 25.
129
While some QUATT certifications no doubt shift risk to negligently injured
individuals, the underlying policy is that the social good enjoyed by the public derived from
individual QUATTs employed in combating terrorism outweighs the risks borne by
potential victims. This is analogous to the nuclear industry, which might prove
unsustainable without protection from potential liability. See infra text accompanying notes
173 - 174. But, as discussed infra Part III.C, no empirical evidence suggests any such
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C. Absence of Empirical Necessity
The GCRA’s drafters asserted that “well-founded fears of future litigation and liability
under existing law discourage contractors from assisting in times of disaster.”130 Such fears
apparently derived from the volume and size of post-September 11th litigation filed against
contractors.131 That anxiety has been fueled by the contracting community, particularly by
contractors that pursued post-Katrina government contracts without liability protection
beyond that afforded by existing law.132 From this public showing of anxiety, the GCRA’s
drafters concluded that contractors would not compete for government contracts in times of
disaster without extraordinary liability protection, that disaster recovery efforts would
consequently prove inadequate, and that the public would suffer. Senator John Thune (R.S.D.) emphasized that the government would be unable to adequately respond to major
disasters without contractor assistance.133 The authors readily concede this point. The
relevant issue is whether contractors can, or will, function without the liability protection
afforded by the GCRA.
Experience suggests, however, that the GCRA drafters’ premise is hyperbolic or
simply incorrect.134 No evidence suggests that a significant number of the nation’s (or the

market failure in, for example, debris removal.
130
S. 1761, 109th Cong. § 2(10) (2005).
131
Senator Thune, who introduced S. 1761, explained that
because of the ongoing multi-billion dollar class action cases filed against the
contractors who assisted the Government in the cleanup of the World Trade Center,
I have concerns that other major disaster cleanups, including Hurricane Katrina,
may be stymied due to the potential for future lawsuits being brought against
contractors who carry out major disaster cleanups on behalf of the Government.
Hearing, supra note 72, at 3 (statement of Sen. John Thune); see also id. at 8 (statement
of Sen. David Vitter).
132
See, e.g., id. at 38 (statement of Warren Perkins) (“I can assure you that responsible
contractors throughout the Country are paying close attention. . . . They are aware of the
litigation that followed [the September 11 attacks]. . . . [T]hey are deeply concerned.”); id.
at 25 (statement of Anthony Zelenka) (“Take a look at what happened [to contractors] in
New York after the terrorists on 9/11. . . . I believe passing the [GCRA] is necessary to
ensure that contractors like me will be there to do the work in the future without fear of
reprisals.”).
133
See id. at 12 (statement of Sen. John Thune).
134
At the hearing, Dr. Beverly Wright called this premise a “complete fabrication,” citing
local contractors’ dissatisfaction with their lack of opportunity to compete for no-bid
contracts for post-Katrina work. Dr. Wright discussed how local contractors were ready
and willing to accept the work and the corresponding liability. See Hearing, supra note 72,
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world’s) best contractors have been discouraged from seeking the United States
Government’s business in the past. The absence of empirical data or concrete information
supporting this assertion by the GCRA’s proponents is stark, but in light of history, it is not
surprising.135
While they have thus far failed to put forth empirical proof, GCRA proponents have
invoked the familiar critiques of opportunistic trial lawyers,136 emboldened by a popular
anecdote involving a failed suit.137 This storyline has been enriched by rhetorical flourishes

at 32 - 33 (statement of Dr. Beverly Wright).
135
At similar hearings twenty years ago, Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) asked the
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) whether any members of its association “no longer
bid on government contracts because of the fear of liability suits.” Indemnification of
Government Contractors: Hearing on S. 1254 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong. 88 - 89 (1985). AIA asserted that it lacked sufficient information to respond at the
hearing and, in a subsequent written response, was no more convincing. Even responding
“on a non-attribution basis,” AIA failed to identify a single firm, and instead merely
asserted that “[t]he consequences of unusually hazardous or nuclear risks arising under
government contract . . . influence the business decision process.” Id. at 96 (Letter from
Lloyd R. Kuhn, Vice President of Legislative Affairs, AIA to Sen. Charles E. Grassley,
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (June 28, 1985)). Similarly, one year earlier,
when Representative Sam Hall (D–Tex.) requested an estimate of the number of contractors
who had restricted their bidding for government contracts due to liability concerns, the
National Association of Manufacturers was unable to give him “reliable data,” stating
merely that “we do feel that there are clearly contractors who will not bid for certain types
of contracts, and that there are certain types of contractors who will not seek this type of
business.” Government Contractors’ Product Liability and Indemnification Acts: Hearing
on H.R. 4083 and H.R. 4199 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 39 (1984) (statement
of T. Richard Brown, Vice President, Law Department, Electronics and Defense Sector of
TRW Inc., on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers). When Representative
Hall revisited the issue with John M. Geaghan of Raytheon Company, Mr. Geaghan
admitted that he knew of no instance when the company refused to pursue a government
contract due to liability concerns. Id. at 161.
136
See Hearing, supra note 72, at 25 (statement of Anthony Zelenka) (“[T]here are
people out there who want to capitalize on this tragedy and others like it. Lawsuits have
been filed against contractors who have performed the types of rescue and recovery work
my firm has been doing in New Orleans.”). Of course, the GCRA’s advocates deny any
animosity towards the plaintiff’s bar. See id. at 38 (statement of Warren Perkins) (“I am not
here to bash plaintiff attorneys.”).
137
Government contractors have identified a lawsuit filed against Boh Brothers
Construction Company as a sign that “[t]he madness has already started in Louisiana.” See
id. at 26 (statement of Anthony Zelenka). The lawsuit accused Boh Brothers of performing
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regarding the putative dichotomy between patriots and trial attorneys.138 The GCRA’s
supporters thus focus on the costs imposed by future lawsuits and class actions while
neglecting to identify any ex ante disincentives created by those costs. This mere fact that
government contractors experience an ex post aversion to lawsuits is an insufficient policy
predicate for legislation extending them liability protection.139 Although empirical
evidence could someday validate the GCRA proponents’ argument,140 the threat of liability
has yet to result in a dearth of available contractors.141
Despite the post-disaster hysteria, the current procurement regime contains
sufficient flexibility for the government to meet its contracting requirements in times of
crisis.142 In awarding post-Katrina recovery contracts, the Army Corps of Engineers has
relied on several FAR procedures that have allowed for increased flexibility in responding
to the disaster.143 Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, the Corps advertised four contracts for

faulty bridge repair work which was apparently performed by an entirely different
contractor, and the suit was dismissed, of course. See id. at 26 (statement of Anthony
Zelenka); id. at 33 (statement of Warren Perkins).
138
One contractor beseeched the Senate to “not let the trial lawyers penalize the
contractors like me who report for duty.” Id. at 27 (statement of Anthony Zelenka).
139
See supra notes 128, 131 (discussing Congress’s rejection of proposed bills to reduce
contractor liability in the 1980s); see also supra note 129 (contrasting the mere desire to
avoid ex post liability with the social necessity of averting real market failures in the
provision of essential or crucial technologies or services).
140
See infra Part IV.A.
141
See infra notes 134 - 135 and accompanying text.
142
See Stan Soloway, Baghdad’s Lessons for New Orleans, GOV. EXEC., Oct. 1, 2005, at
44 - 45, available at http://www.govexec.com/features/1005-01/1005-01advp2.htm
(“[M]any of the flexibilities contained in the [FAR] . . . are poorly understood . . .
includ[ing] limited as opposed to full and open competition, higher levels under which
purchases can be made instantly, and more. . . . [T]hese flexibilities enable[] us to meet the
demands for speed and agility integral to any recovery effort.”); J. Catherine Kunzsee, PreDisaster Contracting: The Use of Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts,
ANDREWS GOV’T CONT. LITIG. REP., Feb. 27, 2006, at 13 (discussing the importance of
indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity contracts in responding to national disasters); see
also OFFICE OF FED. PROCUREMENT POLICY, EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT FLEXIBILITIES: A
FRAMEWORK FOR RESPONSIVE CONTRACTING & GUIDELINES FOR USING SIMPLIFIED
ACQUISITION PROCEDURES (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/ emergency_procurement_flexibilities.pdf.
143
See Hearing, supra note 72, at 17 (statement of Major General Don T. Riley, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers). For example, contracts were awarded under shortened time
periods under the unusual and compelling urgency exception to the CICA, 10 U.S.C. §
2304(c)(2) (2000); 41 U.S.C. § 253(c)(2) (2000), and on the basis of verbal and letter
contracts as authorized by the FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 6.302-2 (2005). See Hearing, supra note
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large debris removal: twenty-two contractors –- eighteen more than the number required –responded.144 Although the response rates for other contracts were not as high, General
Riley could not name a single contract that exhibited insufficient contractor interest.145
IV. FIRST, DO NO HARM
Nonetheless, in performing government contracts, certain contractors may indeed
require protection. It is not surprising that Congress has sought to fashion a remedy to this
limited problem. The challenge, however, is for Congress to adopt an appropriate solution,
rather than an approach that has the potential to harm disaster area residents and relief
workers without fixing the putative problem.
A. Protection Without Moral Hazard
This Article does not dispute the premise that certain contractors, involved in certain
types of disaster relief, may find themselves unable to obtain adequate insurance to cover
their potential liability. Insurance is based on assessing, quantifying, mitigating, and
transferring risks.146 In emergencies, however, a lack of certainty about site conditions and
contracting requirements turns the consideration of such elements into an exercise in
futility.147 If insurers are unable to quantify contractors’ risks, they may not be willing to

72, at 17.
144
Hearing, supra note 72, at 40 (statement of Major General Don T. Riley).
145
While General Riley testified that during the few weeks before November 2004,
several contracts attracted only between one and five bidders, he did not identify any
contracts that failed to attract a single bid. See id. (statement of Major General Don T.
Riley). General Riley also acknowledged that there may be other reasons, unrelated to
liability concerns, to explain the low level of interest in these particular contracts. See id.
While there may be some indications that the level of competitive bidding for Katrina relief
contracts is occasionally less than optimal, there is no evidence of a total incapacity to
attract bids and no reason to believe that fear of liability is the primary cause of any
deficiencies in contractor interest. See infra text accompanying notes 130 - 135.
146
See Hearing, supra note 72, at 86 (statement of Paul Becker, President, Willis
Construction Practice); ROBERT E. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW: BASIC TEXT § 1.2 (1971)
(“Insurance is an arrangement for transferring and distributing risk.”); see also KENNETH S.
ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 64 - 66
(1986) (discussing the importance of accurate assessment and classification of risks).
147
See KEETON, supra note 146 (“As one understands a greater percentage of the relevant
facts, the element of guessing in his description of risk is reduced, and his prediction is
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provide sufficient coverage for those risks.148 The contractors working at Ground Zero
apparently faced this situation.149
Moreover, contractors employed in emergency circumstances face a legitimate threat
of litigation. The inherently uncertain and unstable nature of disaster zones naturally leads
to significant property loss, physical injury, or death.150 Regardless of whether contractor
fault causes these injuries, lawsuits are likely to be filed against them.151 Even unwarranted
or frivolous lawsuits can be devastating without adequate insurance. These risks loom large
for construction and debris contractors, which tend to be particularly small firms with thin

more reliable.”). Insurance companies have expressed concerns about underwriting
contractors working in disaster zones for several reasons: uncertain site conditions; unusual
and unknown health hazards; questions regarding chemicals released during clean-up; the
limited nature of tools available to assess environmental factors; varying local, state, and
federal standards; the fast track nature of the work to be done; and unclear contractual
provisions. See id. at 86 - 87 (statement of Paul Becker).
148
“[I]f insurance companies do not or can not [sic] understand the risks they are being
asked to insure, they have a very difficult time providing the risk financing which allows
companies to operate.” Id. (written statement of Paul Becker).
149
The Executive Vice President of Bovis, a contractor involved in the post-September
11th clean-up, testified that “given the dangerous conditions, the retroactive nature and the
unknown aspects of [the post-September 11] unprecedented effort, commercial insurance
companies would not provide the coverage needed and ultimately only limited liability
coverage was obtained.” Hearing, supra note 72, at 51 (statement of Michael Feigin,
Executive Vice President, Chief Administrative Officer, Bovis Lend Lease Holdings, Inc.).
The President of Willis, a global insurance broker, testified that his company was only able
to secure limited insurance coverage for contractors working at Ground Zero. Id. at 85
(statement of Paul Becker); see also Steven Greenhouse, Contractors at Ground Zero
Denied Insurance for Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2002, at B1.
150
See SIERRA CLUB, POLLUTION AND DECEPTION AT GROUND ZERO REVISITED: WHY IT
COULD HAPPEN AGAIN 14 (2005), available at http://www.sierraclub.org/groundzero/
report2005.pdf (“Any emergency involving the destruction of a large building is likely to
cause a release of hazardous substances.”). The New Orleans area stored massive amounts
of toxic chemicals. See Hearing, supra note 72 (written statement of Dr. Beverly Wright)
(“Dozens of toxic time bombs along Louisiana’s Mississippi River petrochemical corridor,
the 85-mile stretch from Baton Rouge to New Orleans, make the region a major
environmental justice battleground. The corridor is commonly referred to as Cancer
Alley.”).
151
Some injured parties sue the contractors simply because they “are the only [people] in
there that can be sued.” Id. at 56 (statement of Anthony Zelenka); see also supra notes 56,
62 (describing the scope of the government’s sovereign immunity under the FTCA). But
see supra note 89 (arguing that the government’s sovereign immunity may be limited when
it abdicates its discretionary function).
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profit margins. Once more, the September 11th experience is instructive. Some five
thousand claims are currently pending against contractors who assisted with disaster
recovery at the World Trade Center site.152 Even for those contractors facing meritless suits
or those that can overcome a negligence standard, litigation defense absorbs significant
resources that can threaten firms’ survival.153
Thus, contractors’ desire for financial protection when working in disaster zones
under emergency circumstances is understandable. But that desire can be fulfilled in ways
other than the dilution of tort law. Broadly eliminating contractor tort liability is patently
unfair to parties sustaining property loss or bodily injury as a result of negligent actions.
Individuals living and working in disaster zones have suffered, and will continue to suffer,
both financially and physically because of contractor irresponsibility and negligence. The
continuing negative health effects suffered by Ground Zero workers and lower Manhattan
residents are widely recognized,154 and a “Katrina cough” appears frequently in the New

152

Id. at 48 (statement of Michael Feigin); see also id. at 8 (statement of Sen. David
Vitter) (“We know from true, recent experience after 9/11 that there could well be a flurry
of class action lawsuits to try to profit from the emergency measures that needed to be taken
[after Hurricane Katrina] . . . .”); id. at 25 - 26 (statement of Anthony Zelenka) (“Hundreds
of lawsuits were filed against contractors for the heroic work they did to clean up Ground
Zero in a short amount of time at the express direction of the Federal, State, and local
authorities.”).
153
Id. at 48 (statement of Michael Feigin) (“[T]he problem isn’t that we don’t believe that
we can sustain a standard of negligence. We believe that we’ve done nothing wrong. . . .
But the legal fees alone could put a company like ours . . . out of business.”). In response to
pressure from the contracting community, Congress eventually appropriated $1 billion to
fund an insurance program covering injuries to workers incurred during clean-up of the
World Trade Center site. See Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-7, div. K, tit. III, 117 Stat. 11, 517 – 18 (2003); Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Clients’ Rewards
Keep K Street Lobbyists Thriving, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at A1 (“The [General
Contractors Association of New York] paid Carmen [Group Inc.] $500,000 to persuade the
federal government to cover its members' insurance premiums for cleanup work at Ground
Zero after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. After three years of lobbying, the
government agreed . . . .”). The government also appropriated separate funds to ease the
burden September-11th-based claims would have on New York’s workers’ compensation
system. Pub. L. No. 107-117, div. B, ch. 8, 115 Stat. 2230, 2312 – 13 (2002). See
generally GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1013T, SEPTEMBER 11: FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE FOR NEW YORK WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COSTS (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041013t.pdf.
154
Joel Shufro, Executive Director of the New York Committee for Occupational Safety
and Health, testified about these health problems at the Hearing:
Unfortunately, four years following the devastating attacks on the World Trade
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Orleans area.155 Nothing suggests that the injured and suffering individuals should, as a
matter of course, be denied compensation. As Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) explained,
the solution provided by the GCRA “ignores and misapplies the lessons of September
11th.”156
B. Superior Alternatives

Center, respiratory illness, psychological distress and financial devastation have
become a new way of life for many of the responders . . . . Many of the workers are
disabled by chronic pulmonary problems. Some are unable to work. Many have
also suffered substantial economic disruption . . . and do not have health insurance
and are unable to pay for treatment or needed medicine. . . . [T]here are grave
concerns about the potential for workers developing slower starting diseases, such
as cancer, in the future.
Hearing, supra note 72, at 54; see also GAO, WTC HEALTH EFFECTS, supra note 1, at 7 15; MMWR Report, supra note 6, at 808 (finding that of those Ground Zero workers who
participated in a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study, 60% suffered from
lower respiratory symptoms and 74% suffered from upper respiratory symptoms); Greg
Sargent, Zero for Heroes, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Oct. 27, 2003, at 28, available at http://
www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/news/politics/columns/citypolitic/n_9384/ (discussing a
severe pulmonary disease, and consequent financial stresses, suffered by a contractor
employee). Some of these health problems may have directly resulted from contractor
negligence. For example, according to a Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study,
on the three days following September 11th, when exposure was greatest, only 21% of the
participants reported using respiratory protection. MMWR Report, supra note 6, at 808. On
any given day after that, nearly 50% of the workers were not wearing respiratory protection,
something Mr. Shufro attributed to “a management problem.” Hearing, supra note 72, at
66 (statement of Dr. Joel Shufro). Although some workers had protection and decided not
to wear it, “Ground Zero workers -- lacking proper training and accurate official safety
information -- had little incentive to wear the ‘uncomfortable and unmanageable’
respiratory gear.” Michelle Chen, Ground Zero: The Most Dangerous Workplace,
NEWSTANDARD, Jan. 24, 2005, http://newstandardnews.net/ content/index.cfm/items/1402.
Furthermore, some workers received no more than a paper mask. Id.; Hearing, supra note
72, at 60 (statement of Dr. Joel Shufro).
155
See Scott Gold & Ann M. Simmons, “Katrina Cough” Floats Around, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2005, at A10.
156
Hearing, supra note 72, at 14 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton); see also Press
Release, Office of Commc’ns, New York City Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, Most
WTC Health Registry Enrollees Reported New or Worsened Respiratory Symptoms After
9/11/01 (Nov. 22, 2004), available at http://www.nyc.gov/
html/doh/html/press_archive04/pr151-1122.shtml.
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Experience offers superior alternatives to the GCRA that do not sacrifice the
interests of negligently injured parties or contractor personnel. The alternatives discussed
below represent examples of the government’s prior efforts to solve insurance marketplace
failures without denying a recovery to negligently injured individuals.
1. Remedy-Granting Clauses
Ordinarily, parties to government contracts use standardized remedy-granting
clauses157 to allocate the risk of anticipated and unforeseen contingencies158 between the
parties. The implicit premise of these clauses is that they (1) dissuade contractors from
padding their bids, offers, or proposals when competing for government business and
(2) reassure those contractors that the government will equitably adjust contracts to

157

See, e.g., Differing Site Conditions Clause, 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-1 (2005) (anticipating
subsurface or latent physical conditions that differ from the contract or unknown and
unusual site conditions); Changes Clause, 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1 (2005) (anticipating of
potential changes within the scope of the contract); Government Furnished Property Clause,
48 C.F.R. § 52.245-2(a)(3) - (4) (2005) (anticipating potentially defective, or late delivery
of, government furnished property); Termination for Convenience Clause, 48 C.F.R. §
52.249-2 (2005) (anticipating the government’s need to end contracts for a host of
noncontractual reasons). All of these clauses include a similar remedy for the occurrence of
unanticipated contingencies: reimbursement of all allowable costs, plus an allowance for
profit. See Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and
Exceptionalism in Government Contracts Law, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 633, 695 - 97
(1996) (discussing the use of standardized clauses to anticipate unforeseeable contingencies
in government contracts).
158
The FAR define a contingency as “a possible future event or condition arising from
presently known or unknown causes, the outcome of which is indeterminable at the present
time.” 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-7(a) (2005).
[Contingencies] that may arise from presently known or unknown conditions, the
effect of which cannot be measured so precisely as to provide equitable results to
the contractor and to the Government . . . are to be excluded from cost estimates, but
should be disclosed separately . . . to facilitate the negotiation of appropriate
contractual coverage.
Id. § 31.205-7(c)(2); see also Foster Constr. C.A. v. United States, 435 F.2d 873, 887 (Ct.
Cl. 1970) (noting the “long-standing, deliberately adopted procurement policy” that bidders
“need not consider how large a contingency should be added to the bid to cover the risk”);
Richard J. Kendall, Changed Conditions as Misrepresentations in Government
Construction Contracts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 978, 979 - 82 (1967).
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reimburse for unforeseen contingencies.159 This “contingency promise” essentially
provides that in exchange for the contractor’s willingness not to inflate its contract price to
insulate itself against certain potential, although unknown, liabilities, the government
agrees to make the contractor whole when such liabilities are incurred.160
During the performance of government contracts, if an unanticipated contingency
arises that requires the contractor to incur additional costs, the parties have a number of
options.161 The contracting officer162 and the contractor can agree upon compensation and
bilaterally modify their contract.163 Alternatively, the contracting officer can unilaterally
determine the additional compensation to be paid.164 If the contractor is dissatisfied with
the amount of compensation, it can file a claim, which commences the disputes process.165
This orchestrated response to unforeseen liability in government contracts is a far cry from
the GCRA’s insulation of contractors from liability. Rather than providing the contractor
and the government with several alternative methods by which they may allocate between
themselves the costs arising from an unanticipated liability, the GCRA simply imposes
these costs upon the negligently injured individual.166
Generally, the government considers contractor insurance a cost of doing business.
Indeed for some contracts, the government requires contractors to maintain a certain
amount of insurance and permits reimbursement of the contractors’ insurance costs.167
159

Contingency planning strikes at the core of federal procurement policy. See Ralph C.
Nash, Jr., Risk Allocation in Government Contracts, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 698 - 700
(1966) ([“T]erms and conditions . . . are an attempt . . . to define the remedies of the parties
for most foreseeable contingencies that may occur . . . . [T]hese standard terms and
conditions represent a relatively thorough statement of intended risk allocation.”).
160
See Schooner, Fear of Oversight, supra note 87, at 695 – 96.
161
In addition to these options, the contractor may choose to absorb the additional costs
and continue performance. For example, the contractor may forego making a claim against
the government if its assessment of the 1990s reforms –- such as the evaluation of past
performance -– persuades it that the opportunity cost of pursuing the claim outweighs the
value of the claim. See Schooner, supra note 94, at 697 - 98.
162
A contracting officer is a government employee with actual, legal authority to bind the
government in contract. See 48 C.F.R. § 1.602-1 (2005) (providing that contracting officers
have authority to enter into, administer, or terminate contracts and make related
determinations and findings); see also RALPH C. NASH, JR., STEVEN L. SCHOONER & KAREN
R. O’BRIAN, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO THE LANGUAGE OF PROCUREMENT 127 (2d ed. 1998).
163
48 C.F.R. § 43.103(a).
164
Id. §§ 43.103(b), .201.
165
Id. §§ 33.206, 52.233-1; see also 41 U.S.C. §§ 601 - 13 (2000).
166
See supra text accompanying notes 113 - 120.
167
48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(a), (c)(1) (2005); see also id. §§ 28.301, 31.205-19 (2005)
(providing a policy prescription and cost principles regarding insurance of government
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Further, the government may indemnify a contractor for certain liabilities to third parties
(and expenses incidental to such liabilities) above and beyond those covered by insurance
when the liabilities arise out of the performance of the contract.168 The former mechanism
allocates the responsibility of procuring adequate insurance to the contractor, after which
the government reimburses the contractor for the costs of obtaining such protection against
risk; the latter directly gives contractors an extra layer of insurance.
The FAR’s third-party liability provisions could serve as a model for government
indemnification of contractors engaged in disaster relief.169 They would, however, need to
be modified in at least two respects. First, construction and engineering contracts, both of
which are prevalent in disaster recovery efforts, currently are exempted from agreements of
this nature.170 Second, and more problematic, liability protection is subject to the
availability of appropriated funds at the time the contingency occurs.171 As discussed
below, however, once insurance becomes either unattainable or so expensive that the
government is no longer willing to pay for it, the government should be willing to
indemnify its contractors.
2. Extraordinary Protection For Extraordinary Risks

contractors).
168
Id. § 52.228-7(c)(2). The government limits its assumption of liability to claims based
on death, bodily injury, or property damage arising out of performance of the contract. Id.
It disallows indemnification for liabilities that, under the terms of the contract, were the
responsibility of the contractor or that were attributable to the contractor’s “willful
misconduct or lack of good faith.” Id. § 52.228-7(e).
169
See 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(a), (c). Under the indemnification provision, contractors are
only reimbursed for “final judgments or settlements approved in writing by the
Government.” Id. § 52.228-7(c)(2). Therefore, contractors do not necessarily avoid the upfront costs associated with litigation through this type of contractual agreement. See
Hearing, supra note 72, at 76 (statement of Craig S. King). Note, however, that when a
contractor is facing a third-party suit that may be reimbursable under the FAR, the
government is given the option to “settle or defend the claim and to represent the
Contractor in or to take charge of any litigation.” 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(g)(3) (2005). In the
event that the government chooses to exercise this right, the contractor is able to avoid
litigation expenses.
170
48 C.F.R. § 28.311-1 (2005).
171
48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(d). In the context of disaster recovery, the potential liability is
significant. Thus, it is unlikely that the government would have appropriated sufficient
funds, thereby leaving contractors with a large amount of residual liability. See Richard A.
Smith, Indemnification of Government Contractors, BRIEFING PAPERS, Oct. 1982, at 1
(discussing the application of the Antideficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 97-258, 96 Stat. 877
(1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.)).
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With few exceptions,172 when commercial insurance becomes unavailable or
inordinately expensive, the government historically has indemnified contractors and, in
effect, become a direct insurer of its contractors.173 Under Public Law 85-804, the
President may delegate authority to various agencies to provide extraordinary relief for
contracts in connection with the national defense.174 This relief includes indemnification in
those extraordinary circumstances when contracts involve “unusually hazardous or nuclear
risks” for which commercial insurance is unavailable or insufficient.175 Granted, this
statutory vehicle is a tool of last resort, reserved for truly extraordinary circumstances when
the private sector market fails.176 Also, like the FAR third-party liability clauses, Public
172

See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the SAFETY Act and the PREP Act).
See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 2232 (2d Sess. 1958) (indicating Congress’s intent to
authorize the use of indemnification where commercial insurance was unavailable).
174
Pub. L. No. 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (1958) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431 - 1435 (2000)).
See generally Kevin P. Mullen, Extraordinary Contractual Relief: Public Law 85-804 in
the Homeland Security Era, PROCUREMENT LAW., Summer 2002, at 1 (providing a
comprehensive overview of the history and substance of Public Law 85-804). Other
examples of statutory indemnification authority also exist. See 10 U.S.C. § 2354 (2000)
(allowing the military to indemnify research and development contractors for “unusually
hazardous risks”); 42 U.S.C. § 241(a)(7) (2000) (allowing the Department of Health and
Human Services to indemnify contractors under the same terms as the military as outlined
in 10 U.S.C. § 2354); 42 U.S.C. § 2458(b) (2000) (allowing the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration to indemnify users of space vehicles).
175
48 C.F.R. § 50.403-1 (2005); see also id. § 52.250-1 (providing a clause to be inserted
in contracts that have been approved for indemnification). Like the FAR third-party
liability provisions, the government’s liability under Public Law 85-804 does not extend to
claims that arise from contractors’ willful misconduct or lack of good faith. Compare 48
C.F.R. § 52.250-1(d) with id. § 52.228-7(e). Thus far, thirteen major agencies have been
granted indemnification authority: the Atomic Energy Commission; Department of
Agriculture; Department of Commerce; Department of Defense; Department of Health and
Human Services; Department of the Interior; Department of Transportation; Department of
the Treasury; Federal Emergency Management Agency; General Services Administration;
National Aeronautics and Space Administration; Tennessee Valley Authority; and
Government Printing Office. Exec. Order No. 10,789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897 § 21 (Nov. 14,
1958), as amended by Exec. Order No. 11,051, 27 Fed. Reg. 9683 (Sept. 27, 1962); Exec.
Order No. 11,382, 32 Fed. Reg. 16,247 (Nov. 28, 1967); Exec. Order No. 11,610, 36 Fed.
Reg. 13,755 (July 22, 1971); Exec. Order No. 12,148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43,239 (July 20, 1979);
Exec. Order No. 13,232, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,941 (Oct. 20, 2001).
176
The FAR directs agencies not to use their authority under Public Law 85-804 “when
other adequate legal authority exists.” 48 C.F.R. § 50.102(a). The FAR also warns
agencies to avoid granting indemnification “in a manner that encourages carelessness and
laxity on the part of persons engaged in the defense effort.” Id.
173
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Law 85-804 neither avoids the government’s current fiscal crisis177 nor allows contractors
to escape the litigation process. Litigation expenses, however, are reimbursable.178
Furthermore, indemnification under this statute is not constrained by congressional
appropriations.179 Given the potential magnitude of third-party claims arising out of
disaster recovery work, this would prove especially helpful to contractors engaged in postKatrina clean-up.180
Although Public Law 85-804 currently applies only to national security situations,
Congress easily could expand it to cover other circumstances where contractors might not
be able to obtain sufficient insurance, such as disaster relief. Indemnification is preferable
to the GCRA not only because it protects contractors from potentially devastating
liabilities, but also because it helps negligently injured individuals receive compensation.181
Contractors “should not be penalized for showing up,” nor should negligently injured
individuals be left without a remedy. The Public Law 85-804 model would satisfy both of
these admirable goals.
3. Funds
Another indemnification model is the $1 billion liability insurance fund created by
Congress to protect contractors and the State and City of New York against claims related
to debris removal after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.182 Contractors that

177

See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
48 C.F.R. § 52.250-1(b) (“[T]he Government shall . . . indemnify the Contractor
against . . . [c]laims (including reasonable expenses of litigation or settlement) by third
persons (including employees of the Contractor) for death; personal injury; or loss of,
damage to, or loss of use of property.”).
179
Exec. Order No. 11,610, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,755 (July 22, 1971); cf. 48 C.F.R. § 52.2287(d) (subjecting the FAR third party liability provisions to the availability of appropriated
funds at the time a contingency occurs).
180
See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
181
See ROSENTHAL, supra note 125, at 97 - 108 (discussing the benefits and shortcomings
of government indemnification of contractors for catastrophic accidents).
182
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003, div. K, tit. III, 117 Stat 11, 517 - 18
(2003) (“[FEMA] is directed to provide . . . up to $1,000,000,000 to establish a captive
insurance company or other appropriate insurance mechanism for claims arising from
debris removal . . . .”); see also U.S. GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC
ASSISTANCE 1749 – 50 (2005), available at http://12.46.245.173/CFDA/ pdf/catalog.pdf
(detailing the history, objectives, and application process for the creation of the captive
insurance company); Act of July 22, 2003, 2003 N.Y. Sess. Laws 839 - 41 (McKinney)
(codified at N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 7001 – 7012 (McKinney 2003)) (authorizing formation of a
178
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began work at Ground Zero immediately after the terrorist attacks subsequently failed to
obtain sufficient liability insurance due to the uncertain nature of the risks and the
potentially large number of liability claims.183 Therefore, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) appropriated funds for the creation of an insurance company
to provide $1 billion in third-party liability coverage for a period of twenty-five years.184
The City of New York is the named insured on the fund, with approximately 140 of the
city’s contractors and subcontractors as additional named insureds.185 The captive
insurance program is currently defending New York City and its contractors in several
lawsuits arising from their debris removal efforts.186 The indemnification provided by the
fund is more forward-looking than that granted by Public Law 85-804. Although it was
created subsequent to many of the covered injuries, plenty of injuries encompassed by the
fund came to light after its creation and, indeed, are continuing to arise today.187 Because
the captive insurance fund has proven to be extremely useful to contractors facing liability

captive insurance company for liability arising out of disaster relief at the World Trade
Center after September 11th).
183
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-926, DISASTER ASSISTANCE:
INFORMATION ON FEMA’S POST 9/11 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW YORK CITY AREA 16
(2003) [hereinafter GAO, FEMA’S 9/11 ASSISTANCE]; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO-04-72, SEPTEMBER 11: OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE TO THE NEW
YORK CITY AREA 26 (2004) [hereinafter GAO, 9/11 FEDERAL ASSISTANCE]; Steven
Greenhouse, Contractors at Ground Zero Denied Insurance for Cleanup, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
18, 2002, at B1.
184
GAO, FEMA’S 9/11 ASSISTANCE, supra note 183, at 15 - 16; GAO, 9/11 FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE, supra note 183, at 26 - 27. Although FEMA initially indicated that the
insurance fund would be limited to claims for injuries occurring after September 29, 2001,
when the rescue work officially ended, it subsequently backed off from that position.
Jennifer Steinhauer, City May Bear $350 Million in 9/11 Claims, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2004,
at B1; Mike McIntire, New York and FEMA End Dispute Over 9/11 Medical Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 13, 2004, at B3.
185
Hearing, supra note 72, at 48 (statement of Michael Feigin).
186
See id. at 51 (statement of Michael Feigin); Complaint, DiVirgilio v. Silverstein
Properties, 04-CV-07239 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2004) (initiating a class action lawsuit on
behalf of approximately 800 people involved in the clean-up and rescue efforts at Ground
Zero against, inter alia, the four government contractors that led the clean-up: Turner
Construction; AMEC Construction; Tully Construction; and Bovis Lend Lease).
187
Concern about the potential long-term health effects of September 11th is widespread
and has led to the creation of the World Trade Center Health Registry. See World Trade
Center Health Registry, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/wtc/index.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2006); see also Kirk Johnson, Inquiry Opens Into Effects of 9/11 Dust, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2003, at B1. Any future negative health effects could give rise to lawsuits against
the city or its contractors that would be covered by the captive fund.
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from their involvement in clean-up after September 11,188 it frequently is cited as an
alternative to the GCRA.189
The fund was unprecedented190 and is imperfect. A frequent complaint is that the
pool is capped at $1 billion.191 Injuries continue to mount, and, in all likelihood, will
continue to be discovered for years to come.192 The amount of litigation stemming from
contractors’ Ground Zero work continues to grow.193 Thus, it is unclear whether $1 billion
will be sufficient to cover all third-party liability claims. The amount set aside for the fund,
however, was arbitrary, and, should it prove insufficient, the government can increase its
size.
Any program modeled on the September 11th insurance fund should, to the extent
possible, address the shortcomings with its establishment and administration.194
Nonetheless, the fund is preferable to the GCRA because it recognizes, to a certain extent,
government responsibility for certain third-party injuries incurred during post-disaster
clean-up,195 extends liability protection to contractors assisting the government and ensures
188

See Hearing, supra note 72, at 51 (statement of Michel Feigin) (“But for the WTC
Captive [fund] . . . expenses for lawyers and consultants would have exceeded any fees
made in a matter of months. . . . In short, absent the captive [fund], responding to a disaster
when called would have . . . put us out of business.”).
189
See, e.g., id. at 16 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.)); id. at 69 (statement of
Dr. Beverly Wright).
190
See GAO, FEMA’S 9/11 ASSISTANCE, supra note 183, at 30.
191
Hearing, supra note 72, at 49 (statement of Michael Feigin).
192
See Devlin Barrett, Sept. 11-Related Cancers May Not Appear for Decades, Doctors
Say, BIOTERRORISM WEEK, Sept. 27, 2004, at 11.
193
See Hearing, supra note 72, at 85 (statement of Paul Becker, President).
194
For example, the PREP Act, unlike the GCRA or the SAFETY Act, provides for the
establishment of a fund to compensate individuals negligently injured by covered
countermeasures. See Pub. L. 109-148, div. C, 119 Stat. 2680, 2829 – 32 (2005) (to be
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6e). This use of a fund suggests that Congress looked for
guidance on how to manage risk from other prior endeavors besides the SAFETY Act,
perhaps to one of the victim compensation funds. To date, however, Congress has
appropriated no money for the fund, see id. § 257d-6e(a), leading some to question its
effectiveness. See Press Release, Sen. Edward Kennedy, Sen. Tom Harkin & Sen.
Christopher Dodd, Kennedy, Harkin and Dodd Protest Frist Liability Giveaway (Dec. 21,
2005), available at http://kennedy.senate.gov/~kennedy/statements/05/12/2005C22413.html
(“Without a real compensation program, the liability protection in the defense bill provides
a Christmas present to the drug industry and a bag of coal to everyday Americans.”).
Nonetheless, in the PREP Act, Congress recognized the fundamental unfairness of denying
injured individuals any compensation, while the GCRA contains no such
acknowledgement.
195
See generally SIERRA CLUB, supra note 150 (discussing the federal government’s
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their survival,196 and protects individuals negligently harmed by those contractors.
A different fund model can be found in the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program
(VICP),197 created by Congress in 1988 to stabilize the supply of vaccines and establish a
streamlined compensation process for vaccine-related injuries.198 Under the VICP, the
government assumes liability for vaccine-related injuries and deaths through a no-fault
alternative to the tort system.199 VICP compensation is paid out of the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Trust Fund, which is financed by a seventy-five cent tax on certain
vaccines.200
Congress intended the VICP to provide compensation “quickly, easily, and with
certainty and generosity.”201 Like the September 11th fund, however, the VICP has not

failure to adequately warn, protect, account for, and treat individuals living and working in
lower Manhattan after September 11).
196
Michael Feigin of Bovis Lend Lease claimed that the “current World Trade Center
related litigation demonstrates the need for additional clarity, not only to protect contractors
from liability, but also to eliminate or discourage the costly and time consuming process of
the litigation itself.” Hearing, supra note 72, at 52 (statement of Michael Feigin). Earlier,
however, he had admitted that Bovis had received compensation for its work at Ground
Zero and had fewer litigation expenses and potential liabilities due to the September 11th
captive insurance program. See id. at 31. Thus, a program based on the September 11th
fund would recognize and address the financial threats contractors face when they assist the
government in disaster relief.
197
42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2000). See generally DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., HEALTH RES. AND SERVS. ADMIN., NATIONAL VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION
PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2004), http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/ fact_sheet.htm
[hereinafter VICP FACT SHEET].
198
See VICP FACT SHEET, supra note 197; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-00-8,
VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION: PROGRAM CHALLENGED TO SETTLE CLAIMS QUICKLY
AND EASILY 4 - 5 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/he00008.pdf
[hereinafter GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION]. Prior to the creation of the VICP, the
threat of litigation faced by vaccine manufacturers resulted in serious vaccine shortages
which, in turn, decreased the rate of child immunization. See Compensating Vaccine
Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 106th Cong. 106
(1999) (statement of Thomas E. Balbier, Jr., Director, National Vaccine Injury Program).
199
The Secretary of Health and Human Services is the designated respondent in lawsuits
filed under the VICP. VICP FACT SHEET, supra note 197. The vaccine manufacturer and
administrator are not involved in the proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11(a)(3).
200
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i)(2); 26 U.S.C. § 9510 (2000). The fund, however, is available
to compensate for vaccine-related injuries that occurred both before and after its
establishment. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i).
201
H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, pt. 1, at 3 (1986); see also GAO/HHES-00-8, supra note 198, at
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pleased everyone.202 Any indemnification regime based on previously established funds
should, of course, incorporate the lessons learned from its predecessors. Although neither
fund is perfect, both the September 11th captive insurance company and the VICP are more
responsible and equitable approaches to the alleviation of crushing liabilities than the
GCRA.
V. CONCLUSION: OF JUSTICE AND EFFICIENCY
As the World Trade Center attacks and Hurricane Katrina violently demonstrated,
the government heavily relies upon the private sector’s expertise, and its nearly limitless
capacity, after national disasters to provide emergency services, restore order, and begin the
reconstruction process. Contractors -- drawn both by altruistic interests and profit motives - promptly answer the government’s call. Experience suggests that, in their haste, neither
the government nor its contractors obtain sufficient information to assess and avoid the
risks associated with critical tasks, such as rescue operations and debris removal. To the
extent that haste breeds an absence of, or reduction in, caution, the potential for negligent
injury increases.
A legal regime in which injured parties alone bear the costs of contractor negligence
is untenable. Accordingly, the government mandates, and reimburses the costs of,
contractor insurance. If, due to the immensity of destruction following a disaster or
inadequate information in light of a crisis, the insurance industry fails to offer economically
feasible protection to contractors, the government must fill the void. The government -armed with sovereign immunity and able to, on the one hand, widely disperse the burden to
the taxpaying public and, on the other hand, incur and carry debt -- may choose to directly
insure its contractors. But in no event can the government’s recognition that it must
provide meaningful protection for its contractors result in unmitigated risk to potential

5 (“VICP features designed to expedite the process include a relaxation of the rules of
evidence, discovery, and other legal procedures that can prolong cases in the legal
system.”).
202
Concerns raised include the VICP’s processing time, the adversarial nature of the
process, the imbalance between the resources available to the opposing parties, and the fund
balance. See Compensating Vaccine Injuries: Are Reforms Needed?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the H. Comm. on
Government Reform, 106th Cong. 32 - 34 (1999) (statement of Linda Mulhauser, a
petitioner of the VICP fund); id. at 58 - 59 (statement of Marcel Kinsbourne, pediatric
neurologist); id. at 79 – 91 (statement of Clifford J. Shoemaker, Senior Partner, Shoemaker
& Horn); GAO, VACCINE INJURY COMPENSATION, supra note 198, at 19 (“While VICP was
expected to provide compensation for vaccine-related injuries quickly and easily, these
expectations have often not been met.”); id. at 7 - 11, 16.
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victims of contractor negligence. Legislative solutions must consider the interests of the
government, the contractors upon which the government depends, and the public.
Governmental indemnification, on an ad hoc basis, has proven effective. Similarly, where
the insurance industry cannot provide a market solution, the government, in large part
successfully, has experimented with captive funds or pools.
In the end, any legislative solution should endeavor to achieve two potentially
synergistic ends: deterring, to the optimal degree, contractors from causing harm and, when
harm does result, compensating the victims. Because the two ends are not entirely
identical, balance is required. Forcing contractors to internalize all of the costs of harm
imposed upon victims -- particularly where there is a failure of the insurance market -–
could result in excessively risk averse behavior. Such behavior could impede and
potentially frustrate recovery efforts or dramatically increase the government’s costs.
Conversely, unnecessary or excessive protection might encourage irresponsible behavior or,
at a minimum, discourage firms from undertaking a socially desirable level of care. For
example, creating a government-financed litigation fund without a cap may prove effective
for compensating victims, but it would not serve to deter potential tortfeasors. Conversely,
such a cap likely would result in either victims or contractors bearing some portion of the
cost of the harms caused.
The sponsors of the Gulf Coast Recovery Act do not appear to have grappled with
these thorny issues. Rather, the GCRA smacks of opportunism, and accordingly, merits
attention and scrutiny. As a matter of law, it distorts the government contractor defense
beyond recognition. As a matter of policy, the breadth and scope of Hurricane Katrina’s
devastation fail to justify capitulation to the unsubstantiated and oft-rebuffed contractor
demands for insulation from liability. No empirical case proves that the insurance market
has failed or that broad insulation of disaster-area contractors is necessary. Moreover, the
GCRA would not encourage responsible contractor behavior; instead it creates a moral
hazard, exposing potential victims to physical injury and financial ruin. Any solution that
potentially increases the risk of negligent injuries is fundamentally flawed. It also violates
basic principles of justice and fairness, particularly after the devastation already caused by
Hurricane Katrina. The Gulf Coast Recovery Act’s effort to capitalize upon national
disasters is not only ill-conceived and inefficient, but harms the credibility of the federal
government’s procurement process. Congress should examine its own legislative repertoire
more fully before going down this perilous path.

